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L Introduction: The Garbage Cases Demonstrate Disturbing Trends
in CurrentDormant Commerce Clause Case Law
A. Pushing Trash to the Forefront
This article uses garbage and dormant Commerce Clause cases to explore larger
points about dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. I focus on the garbage cases
not just because that is where I first was mired in searches for dormant Commerce
Clause truths,' but also because these cases are on the cutting edge of dormant
Commerce Clause theory. In its first garbage case, Philadelphiav. New Jersey,2 the
United States Supreme Court began the trend toward pre-sorting dormant Commerce
Clause cases into two distinct categories.3 If a regulation clearly discriminated
against other states, it would be subject to virtual per se invalidity. If a regulation did
not discriminate, it would be allowed to have incidental effects on interstate

commerce. In more recent garbage decisions, the Court has insisted on labeling a
regulation either discriminatory or nondiscriminatory before it engages in any further
analysis.4 This emphasis on pre-sorting has led to increasingly unproductive
wrangling about what label should be put on a regulation rather than inquiring about
the benefits and harms of the regulation.
Some lower courts, in response to the Court's insistence that cases be preliminarily

pigeon-holed, have attempted to redirect dormant Commerce Clause theory towards
the protection of status quo economic rights. Such courts pre-sort into the

discrimination stack all regulations which interfere with out-of-state business or
which seem to have been passed because of animosity toward out-of-state business.
These courts essentially are advocating, through the garbage cases, that the dormant
Commerce Clause requires no significant economic interference with existing private
interstate markets Other courts, equally erroneously, have tried to escape having

1. My first involvernent with waste and the dormant Commerce Clause was in 1989-90, when in
private practice I represented citizen-group plaintiffs who opposed expansion of a Kentucky landfill
designed to receive primarily out-of-state trash. During my work for the Office of Attorney General of
Kentucky in 1990-92, I advised on the constitutionality of legislation proposed for the 1991 Special
Session of the Kentucky Legislature; co-authored amicus briefs in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc.
v. Michigan Dep'tof Nataral Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992), and Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt,
504 U.S. 334 (1992); authored an amicus brief before the Sixth Circuit in NationalSolid Waste Mgmt.
Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Ohio 1991), rev'd and remanded, 959 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.
1992); co-authored the briefs in Carpenterv. Kentucky, 831 S.W.2d 188 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); and issued
numerous informal opinion letters and advice on waste issues. Since joining academia, I have provided
limited pro-bono assistance to attorneys for Clarkstown in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383 (1994), to the State of Oregon and state amici in Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep't
of EnvtL Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994), to the State of Wisconsin on its petition for certiorari in National
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass' v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995), and to numerous other waste litigants
on the state side. I also ,ery occasionally have provided assistance to waste industry parties, sometimes
for fee.
2. 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that state ban on importing garbage violates dormant Commerce
Clause in absence of any reason for treating waste differently based on origin).
3. See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 31-116 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 181-250 and accompanying text.
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their regulations labeled discriminatory per se, even though their factual situations are
virtually indistinguishable from what the Court previously has pre-sorted into that
pile. These courts try to claim that no preliminary label of discrimination can attach
when there is the possibility that regulatory benefits will outweigh Commerce Clause
harms.'
Why is there such lower court confusion? I believe that the Court's insistence on
dichotomization inevitably has produced the confusion we now see among lower
courts. By describing in this article the Court's development of and application of its

either-or tests in the garbage context, and by here also describing lower courts'
perversions of the Court's garbage precedents, I hope to cast doubt on the legitimacy
of the Court's current dormant Commerce Clause methodology. My hope is that the
Court would seriously consider returning to a meaningful balancing approach as the
sole test for Commerce Clause disputes. But if this is not an idea the Court currently
might embrace, I at least hope to invite correction of some of the worst excesses
which a deterministic dichotomized test inevitably has produced. The garbage cases
demonstrate that results produced by lower courts can be no better than the dormant
Commerce Clause guidance which the Court provides. The garbage cases
demonstrate both the lack of consistent underlying rationale in the Court's current
dormant Commerce Clause methodology and the confusion inevitably resulting when

lower courts try to apply this unsatisfying methodology.7

6. See infra notes 117-78 and accompanying text.
7. My goal in this article is therefore relatively modest. Although I have strong views on how
dormant Commerce Clause analysis should proceed, enshrining my own methodology as the preferred
alternative to the current dormant Commerce Clause confusion is not the primary goal of this piece.
Instead, I primarily describe and criticize, in the hopes that even those who do not share my particular
perspective on what should be dormant Commerce Clause methodology will at least be persuaded that
lower court confusion is real, and that this confusion comes largely in response to Supreme Court
insistence on dichotomization and pigeonholing. The garbage cases provide excellent examples of the
confusion, since they show lower courts oppositely misconstruing Supreme Court precedent in their
attempts to fall on the right side of the Court's deterministic categories of Commerce Clause scrutiny.
This is not to say that my views on how dormant Commerce Clause analysis should proceed do not
get voiced herein. Unlike those who claim that the dormant Commerce Clause should be largely
abandoned or subsumed within other constitutional protections, I believe the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine serves a useful function. But see, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause
to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the ConstitutionalBalanceof Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569; Mark Tushnet, Rethinking
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125. As a clause specifically asked to deal with
economic matters, it ensures that there will be both national economic markets when these are needed
as a matter of national policy, and also that there will be no economic discrimination against out-of-state
businesses in favor of in-state economic actors, who are often able to exert lobbying pressure on their
local law makers to pass laws in their favor.
Unlike those, however, who believe that the dormant. Commerce Clause is designed to ensure
economic efficiencies, I believe its purpose is to prevent state overreaching vis-h-vis other states or as
against federal political interests. But see, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional
Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 43 (1988); Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause,
and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-MarketPolicy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227
(1995); William L. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participantsin Solid Waste
Disposal Services - Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector? 18 ENVTL. L. 779
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B. More and More Garbage
The number of garbage decisions alone is significant. Garbage in fact seems to

have replaced milk or minnows as today's primary subject for dormant Commerce
Clause dispute. Some eight years ago, when I first began seriously "talking trash,"
in a dormant Commerce Clause sense, the relevant precedents could be collected in
one thin file folder. In the two years preceding this article's composition, the lower
courts produced over forty significant decisions involving waste and commerce!'

(1988); Jacques LeBocuf, The Economics of Federalism andthe ProperScope of the FederalCommerce
Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994); Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Commerce Clause Challenges to
State Taxes, 75 MINN. L. REV. 907 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at
Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. Rev. 895 (1992).
Only when the need is for unitary national markets, which situation is rare, does the clause ensure that
the states do not infringe on federal values. The Court, in essence, declares that preemptive federal
common law requires no state regulation different from what is authorized as prevailing practice in the
marketplace. In the more normal situation, where each state is left free to regulate within its own sphere
of influence differently fiom other states, the clause ensures that states do not use their sovereignty to
infringe unduly upon the economic interests of outsiders who are citizens of co-equal sovereigns. Thus,
I read the famous quo:e fiom H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) that "every
farmer and every craftsm m shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access
to every market in the Nation," and that "every consumer may look to the free competition from every
producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any" as ensuring only access to markets
in the selling state on the same terms for all comers. The prohibition is against discriminatory tariffs or
against other measures which operate effectively as tariffs. Regulation for health and safety reasons is
not prohibited. Nor does the dormant Commerce Clause guarantee access on the same terms the producer
may have lobbied for and won in the state of production. To hold otherwise would encourage the worst
sort of race to laxity and frustrate the sovereignty of a state which has a right evenhandedly to regulate
products sold within it.
As to exactly how one should determine what constitutes impermissible favoritism, my preference is
to ask whether there is direct differential economic effect which is not offset by some significant
regulatory purpose. In short, I believe there is much to be said for returning to a unitary standard of
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny modeled after Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
which inquires as fully as did that case into the reality of economic effects and the legitimacy of state
purposes. Cf. Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much - An Examination of Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence,50 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 47 (1981); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism:Maling Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986);
Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation:
An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985); Michael E. Smith,
State Discrimination.,, Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1986); Winkfield F.
Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discriminationin Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REV.
381 (1995); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487

(1981).
8. See Atlantic Coast Demolition v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 112 F.3d 652 (3d Cir. 1997);
Individuals for Responsible Gov't, Inc. v. Washoe County, 110 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1997); Gary D. Peake
Excavating v. Town Board of Hancock, 93 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1996); SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown,
66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995); Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995); Environmental Tech. Council v.
Sierra Club, 98 F. 3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996); Chambers Medical Tech. of S.C. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252 (4th
Cir. 1995); National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995); Ben Oehrleins
& Sons & Daughters v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1997); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota,
47 F.3d 263 (8th Cir. 19 5); Kleenwell Biohazard Waste v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 1995); Condon
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This litigation has proliferated despite two United States Supreme Court waste and
Commerce Clause decisions in 1992' and another two in 1994." The players

v. Andino, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 323 (D. Me. 1997); Waste Mgmt. of Mich. v. Ingham County, 941 F.
Supp. 656 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Ben Oehrleins, Inc. v. Hennepin County, Minn., 922 F. Supp. 1396 (D.
Minn. 1996); Poor Richard's Inc. v. Ramsey County, Minn., 922 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1996);
Robinson Rubber Prods. Co. v. Hennepin County, No. 4-95-220, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4365 (D. Minn.
Mar. 29, 1996); Robinson Rubber Prods. Co. v. Hennepin Cty. Minn., 927 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1996);
Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist., No. 5-95-228, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15921 (D. Minn July 2, 1996); Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders, 931 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1996); Barker Brothers Waste, Inc. v. Dyer County Legislative
Body, 923 F. Supp. 1042 (W. D. Tenn. 1996); Connecticut Carting Co. v. Town of East Lyme, 946 F.
Supp. 152 (D. Conn. 1995); James Emory, Inc. v. Twiggs County, 883 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ga. 1995);
Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin, 886 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1995); National Solid
Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Williams, 877 F. Supp. 1367, 1375-76 (D. Minn. 1995); Vince Refuse Serv. v.
Clark County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., No. C-3-93-319, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5008-(S.D. Ohio Mar.
7, 1995); Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Callaghan, No. 5:93CIV189, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17490 (N.D.
W. Va. Sept. 28, 1995); Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga.
1994); Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts Cty., 855 F. Supp. 1264; (M.D. Ga. 1994); Ben Oehrleins &
Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, Minn., No. 4-94-63, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15786 (D. Minn.
Nov. 1, 1994); Mid-American Waste Systems v. Fisher, No. C-2-94-493, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20966
(S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994); Southcentral Pa. Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid
Waste Auth., 877 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept.
of Health and Env. Control, 843 F. Supp. 100 (D.S.C. 1994); Chambers Medical Tech. v. Jarrett, 841
F. Supp. 1402 (D.S.C. 1994); In re R.T. Opdenaker & Sons, No. 96-13857DAS, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 660
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 11, 1996); Connecticut v. A. Secchiaroli & Sons, No. C1960461353, 1996 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2448 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 1996); Town of Guilford v. D.P.L. Refuse Serv., Inc.,
No. CV95-02505755, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1172 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1996); Citizens for
Logical Alternatives & Responsible Env't, Inc. v. Clare County Bd. of Comm'rs, 536 N.W.2d 286 (Mich.
App. 1995); Sanifill, Inc. vs. Kandiyohi County, Minn., 559 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997);
Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys., Inc. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist., 558 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997); In re Emergency Redirection of Solid Waste, 645 A.2d 144 (N.J. Ct. App. 1994); Empire
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 684 A. 2d 1047 (Pa. 1996); Smith v. Borough of East
Stroudsburg, 694 A.2d 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); Delaware County v. Raymond T. Opdenaker & Sons,
652 A.2d 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); All Cycle, Inc. v.-Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 670 A.2d 800
(Vt. 1995).
9. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353
(1992) (holding that a Michigan statute which allows local governments to reserve privately owned
landfills for in-county use is facially discriminatory against interstate commerce and cannot survive
heightened scrutiny, since less discriminatory alternatives exist for any health and safety concerns); see
also Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (finding that tax placed at higher rate
on out-of-state hazardous waste despite no alleged difference in harms caused by out-of-state waste and
without attempts to justify tax as compensatory tax is facially discriminatory, held to strictest scrutiny,
and therefore unconstitutional); infra notes 32, 33-50 and accompanying text.
10. See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (holding that flow control
ordinance which deprives local waste generators of opportunity to participate in the wider competitive
waste processing market is per se discriminatory and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny; under such
scrutiny legitimate local purposes cannot justify the discrimination against interstate commerce, since less
discriminatory alternatives for accomplishing health and safety or revenue purposes exist); see also
Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dept. of Envtl. Qual., 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (holding that tax on out-of-state
waste set at amount exactly equal to amount of harm caused by the out-of-state waste, and which amount
is presumed paid by in-state funds in regard to in-state waste, was unconstitutional because it could not
satisfy substantially equivalent event requirement); infra notes 51-108 and accompanying text.
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involved in the waste battles are not getting the Supreme Court's message, in large
part because that message is not clear. But the waste cases do not just exemplify the
Court's general dormant Commerce Clause confusion. They also provide cutting edge
examples of combatants trying to refashion the Court's messages into a more proindustry or pro-regulatory direction. With political and financial stakes on both sides
of waste disputes very high, garbage cases repeatedly are litigated to the appellate
level, becoming important precedents not just for waste situations, but for all of
dormant Commerce Clause inqdiry." If there is to be further reshaping of dormant
Commerce Clause doztrine, it may well take place in a future Court garbage case.
Unfortunately, current lower court precedents are neither consistent with each
other, nor in line with the controlling Supreme Court pronouncements. They
therefore are unlikely to provide a good blueprint for how the Court should apply
future dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Instead, the lower court and Supreme
Court garbage cases together highlight current tensions and disagreement about
developments in dormant Commerce Clause case law. They involve regulators
pretending the Court has not ruled strongly against them. They involve businessmen
trying to twist Court precedent into ever more pro-business directions. They show
the Court meanwhile increasingly using its per se test in a more mechanical and
determinative way, without yet sufficiently justifying why presumptions should be set
so strongly against state efforts which may have only incidental differential effects.
In response to the Court's pronouncements and the continued waste litigation, lower
courts have responded inconsistently. Some have attempted to avoid the thrust of the
Court's recent messages. Others have twisted the Court's messages toward a neorevival of economic due process rights. Both types of misreading of Supreme Court
rationale receive equal criticism in this article. My goal is to identify where lower
courts are misreading the controlling precedents, and thereby make clearer the
confusion of the Court's decrees. 2

11. The garbage litigation is likely to continue so long as there are inconsistent lower court
interpretations of what th2 Supreme Court requires, and so long as parties believe they have strong
incentive in particular litigated waste disputes to misconstrue Court precedents in the hope of winning
localized, if only temporary victories. Additionally, when Congress rejected pleas early in 1996 to
solve pressing flow control waste problems legislatively, the courts became the only forum for
resolution of these important issues. See, e.g., Canan, House Defeats Flow Control; Blow to Waste
Bondholders, THE BOND BUYER, Feb. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Directory, Asapii File
(briefly describing background for and reaction to House vote January 31, 1996, defeating the flow
control provisions of H.R. 349). Ironically, significant decisions from the Second and Third Circuits
resuscitated the moribund flow control which Congress was in the very process of not authorizing. The
Supreme Court, however, let both appellate decisions stand. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of
Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Tri-County Indus. v. Mercer County, 116
S. Ct. 1265 (1996); SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 911 (1996). Because of this, hope inevitably will be renewed in some quarters that the
significance of cases like C&A Carbone and Oregon Waste Systems has been overstated, and there is
likely to be a renewed push by environmentalists and regulators fighting other waste battles to play
close to or over the edge. of the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause rulings. See, e.g., infra
note 17 (collecting flow control cases, including some from the Sixth Circuit, which follow the Second
and Third Circuits' lead).
12. An additional possible reaction to unsavory Court dormant Commerce Clause rulings would be
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First, although I am sympathetic to the impulses which stir some lower courts to
claim that the dormant Commerce Clause cannot possibly require illogical and
expensive government policy, 3 I believe that the Court recently and unequivocally

legislative overruling. Since Court dormant Commerce Clause pronouncements are only made when
Congress is silent, a clear congressional statement contrary to what the Court has ruled overrules the
Courts' decisions. In the waste context, Congress several times in the last few years explicitly was urged
to authorize flow control programs which otherwise would violate the Court's reading of the Commerce
Clause's requirements. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-534 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 104-2323, at Sec. 201(B)
(1995); see also, e.g., Landers & Parsons, Flow Control Legislation Flounders While Interest in Ash
Reuse Is Revitalized, FLA. ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Mar. 1996 (summarizing flow control
legislative history). These legislative efforts met with most recent defeat in early 1996. See supra note
11. Although flow control legislation is again before Congress in 1997, the prospects for its passage
appear at least questionable if not dim. See, e.g., N.J. DelegationSplit Spells Trouble For Flow Control,
NAT'L JOURNAL'S CONGRESSDAILY, Mar. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Directory, Cngdly File;
cf, e.g., Michael Stanton, Groups Pressure New Congress On Flow Control, Stadium Bill, THE BOND
BUYER, Feb. 28, 1997 (expressing somewhat more optimism).
13. My prior and continuing personal involvement in waste battles has been primarily on behalf of
state or local regulators attempting to fight off, or at least ameliorate, the uninvited burdens of out-of-area
or out-of-state trash. See supra note 1. Each of the four most recent Court precedents has been a defeat
for such regulatory efforts. I remain convinced the Court's "free flow" waste and Commerce Clause
decisions are bad environmental policy, since they encourage waste generators to dump onto others the
externalized burdens of their generation, rather than deal themselves with the costs of their own waste
generation. See Stanley E. Cox, Burying MisconceptionsAbout Trash and Commerce: Why It Is Time
to Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 813 (1991) [hereinafter Cox, Burying
Misconceptions]; cf Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 350 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (indicating that Court "gets it exactly backwards" by penalizing those who try to address their
waste problems in a balanced way by striking down their regulations, and allowing states who are not
addressing their problems to export these problems to others). But with recent Court precedents
unambiguously on the books, it is unavailing to argue outside of the law review arena that garbage
should be considered a special case for dormant Commerce Clause analysis. For other commentators who
have attacked the PhiladelphiaCourt's logic or argued for exceptions from it, see, for example, Patrick
C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the
Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. REv. 409 (1992); Anne Ziebarth, Environmental Law: Solid Waste
TransportandDisposalAcross State Lines-The Commerce Clause Versus the GarbageCrisis,1990 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 365; Samuel R. Bloom, Note, The Need for a New Dormant Commerce Clause Test: A
Time to Discard Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 18 HAMLINE L. REv. 80 (1994);
Susan Adams Brietzke, Note, HazardousWaste in Interstate Commerce: Minimizing the Problem After
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 77 (1989); Christine M. Fixl, Comment,
Hazardous Waste and PartialImport Bans: An Environmentally Sound Exception to the Commerce
Clause, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 149 (1992); William J. Holmes, Note, Garbage,the Police Power,and the
Commerce Clause: City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 8 CAP. U. L. REv. 613 (1979).
For other commentary not so hostile to Philadelphia,which has analyzed Commerce Clause doctrine
by focusing on the garbage cases, see, for example, Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does Garbage Have
Standing?: Democracy, Flow Control and a Principled ConstitutionalApproach to Municipal Solid
Waste Management, 11 PACE ENVTL L. REv. 157 (1993); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National
Market in Solid Waste: Trade-offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection,and State Autonomy,
73 N.C. L. REv. 1481 (1995); Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Waste War: Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Department of Environmental Quality, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 43 (1995); Edward A. Fitzgerald,
The Waste War. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources and
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 78 (1994); Martin E. Gold, Solid
Waste Management and the Constitution's Commerce Clause, 25 URB. LAW. 21 (1993); Bradford C.
Mank, Out-of-State Trash: Solid Waste and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 J. URB. & CONTEMP.
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has enshrined fairly mechanical Commerce Clause values as a higher constitutional
good. This enshrining has occurred despite clearly deleterious effects on social
policy. So far as sound policy is concerned, the illogic of the Court's holdings is
especially evident in the waste management context. The garbage cases therefore
provide an excellent example of how the Court's rigid insistence on pigeon-holing can
trump more meaningful inquiry into dormant Commerce Clause values. Nevertheless,
given the Court's increasingly mechanical approach, renewed or repeated attempts in
further waste litigation to subvert the Court's recent emphases may backfire in
ultimately harsher defeat for states' abilities to act, not just in regard to garbage, but
ifi all contexts. Three waste decisions from the Second 4 and Third"5 Circuits
therefore receive special attention in this article as examples of such attempts to
avoid what the Court has decreed." These recent Second and Third Circuit opinions
are clearly inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. 7 Since more is at

L. 25 (1990); C.M.A. McCauliff, The EnvironmentHeld in Trustfor Future Generationsor the Dormant
Commerce Clause Held Hostage to the Invisible Hand of the Market?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 645 (1995);
Clifford S. Russell, Economic Incentives in the Management ofHazardous Wastes, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 257 (1988); Michael R. Harpring, Comment, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage:MunicipalSolid Waste
and the Need for CongressionalAction, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 851 (1991); Alice Jean Mansell, Note,
North DakotaEnters the DumpingGround Wars: A Case Studyforlncentive-BasedRegulations, 69 N.D.
L. REV. 575 (1993); Jonathan Phillip Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis:IncreasedFederal
Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEo. L.J. 567 (1991); Erin
A. Walter, Note, The Supreme Court Goes Dormant When Desperate Times Call for Desperate
Measures: Looking to the European Unionfor a Lesson in Environmental Protection, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1161 (1996).
14. See SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995); USA Recycling, Inc. v.
Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995).
15. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub
nom. Tri-County Indus. v. Mercer County, 116 S. Ct. 1265 (1996).
16. See infra notes 117-78 and accompanying text.
17. Such reasoning may temporarily carry the day for Philadelphia, and perhaps for New Jersey.
See, e.g., New Jersey Officials Hopeful Flow Control Can Continue, SOLID WASTE REP., Mar. 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Market Directory, lacnews File (quoting New Jersey waste regulator as relying on
Court's denial of certiorari in Smithtown as a green light for flow control via contractual arrangements).
But see infra notes 144, 153, 159 (updating status of current challenges to New Jersey flow control
arrangements). Such reasoning also has been followed by two lower courts in the Sixth Circuit. See
Waste Mgmt. of Mich. v. Ingham County, 941 F. Supp. 656 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Barker Brothers Waste,
Inc. v. Dyer County Legislative Body, 923 F. Supp. 1042 (W. D. Tenn. 1996); see also Vince Refuse
Serv. v. Clark County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., No. C-3-93-319, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5008 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 7, 1995) (upholding flow control ordinance which requires generator either to deliver waste
to designated county facility or to ship waste out-of-state); Citizens for Logical Alternatives &
Responsible Env't, Inc. v. Clare County Bd. of Comm'rs, 536 N.W.2d 286 (Mich. App. 1995) (allowing
some intrastate flow control). But see Mid-American Waste Sys. v. Fisher, No. C-2-94-493, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20966 (S. D. Ohio May 31, 1994) (citing C&A Carbone, court grants TRO on enforcement
of flow control ordinance involving county-owned waste to energy facility). Cf. Ben Oehrleins & Sons
& Daughters v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1997) (declaring flow control unconstitutional
for waste headed for out-of-state but constitutional as to waste remaining in-state).
Nevertheless, arguments such as promoted in the recent Second and Third Circuit opinions have not
been persuasive for other courts. See generally Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin
County, Minn., 922 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1996); Poor Richard's Inc. v. Ramsey County, 922 F. Supp.
1387 (D. Minn. 1996); Robinson Rubber Prods. Co. v. Hennepin County., Minn., 927 F. Supp. 343 (D.
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stake than just waste regulations, the erroneous arguments of these courts need to be
refuted and placed in the larger context of dormant Commerce Clause case law. This
is necessary to preserve opportunities for state regulation and market participation
both within and outside of the waste context that have not yet been foreclosed by the
Court, and which seem in line with its prior pronouncements.
Not all courts, however, are misconstruing Court precedent in environmentally
friendly fashion. Backlash against waste regulations which are transparently
unconstitutional under the Court's current precedents often has resulted in some
members of the judiciary attempting to usher in a neo-revival of substantive
economic due process through the dormant Commerce Clause. This is the truly
frightening possibility raised by some recent garbage cases. These garbage cases
appear to be in the vanguard of the movement to rewrite dormant commerce
jurisprudence. Accordingly, I spend a significant amount of time in this article
explaining why these recent pro-business lower court Commerce Clause and trash
rulings are inconsistent with fundamental dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 8 The
illogic of these decisions should be corrected by the Court, if and when state
regulators stop making unconstitutional arguments, and instead stick within
boundaries the Court still has in place to protect state action from dormant
Commerce Clause attack.
My focus in this article upon recent garbage cases, in short, should not mask the
significance of these waste wars for dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence more
generally. What is at issue in these quintessential dormant Commerce Clause dramas
is whether states may act to protect or benefit their citizens, or whether, absent
congressional intervention, free market morality is all that is constitutionally
permissible. Many important arguments about whether the dormant Commerce
Clause prevents states from addressing harms caused or problems unaddressed by
interstate business arise in the waste cases. The Court itself has gotten dormant
Commerce Clause arguments partially off track by unnecessarily emphasizing, in its

Minn. 1996); Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist., No. 5-95-228, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921 (D. Minn. July 2, 1996); Connecticut Carting Co. v. Town of East Lyme, 946
F. Supp. 152 (D. Conn. 1995); Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D.
Ga. 1994); Southcentral Pa. Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., 877
F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814
F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993); Container Corp. of Carolina v. Mecklenberg County, No. 92cv-154-MU
(W.D.N.C. June 19, 1992); Sanifill, Inc. vs. Kandiyohi County, 559 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997),
1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 178; Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys., Inc. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist.,
558 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Connecticut v. A. Secchiaroli & Sons, No. C1960461353, 1996
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2448 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 1996); Town of Guilford v. D.P.L. Refuse Service,
Inc., No. CV95-02505755, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1172 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1996); Empire
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 684 A. 2d 1047 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); In re Emergency
Redirection of Solid Waste, 645 A.2d 144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); Empire Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Comm. 684 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1996); Delaware County v. Raymond T. Opdenaker & Sons, Inc., 652
A.2d 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); cf. Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin, 886 F. Supp.
955 (D.Mass. 1995) (addressing issues in addition to unconstitutionality of flow control ordinance); All
Cycle, Inc. v. Chittenden Solid Waste District, 670 A.2d 800 (Vt. 1995) (similar to Bonollo). It is my
prediction that if the Court returns to the issue, it will reject the Second and Third Circuit rationales.
18. See infra notes 181-250 and accompanying text.
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waste cases, the need to decide what Commerce Clause test should be applied, rather
than more properly inquiring into whether an activity is truly a threat to the
antiprotectionist goals which the Commerce Clause is designed to promote. Concomitantly, the Court has been too eager to find discrimination, triggering its per se
test, on waste facts that are at least ambiguous.
Nevertheless, despite troubling tendencies in the Court's recent trash pronouncements, those precedents do not yet recycle economic substantive due process
through the dormant Commerce Clause. My hope in this article is to improve future
dormant Commerce Clause analysis by focusing on three things. I wish to explore
the distortions of Court precedent by pro-environment regulators and courts. I also
wish to examine contrary distortions made by waste industry advocates and probusiness courts. Throughout the article, I wish to explain how the Court's attempted
simplifications in the waste context have led to confusion in dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.
IL Where the Court Has Dumped Us
To demonstrate that both waste regulators and waste profiteers are misconstruing
the Court's Commerce Clause holdings, one must first describe what the Court has
decreed about waste under the dormant Commerce Clause."9 This is no easy task,
given inconsistent tendencies in several portions of Court dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine.2 Important themes nevertheless emerge!' The Court's main theme in its
waste decisions is that states may not use the real harms associated with waste
disposal as an excuse to favor insiders over outsiders when apportioning the costs of
waste disposal, at least where private markets are involved. Even when the state does
not deliberately intend to discriminate against out-of-state interests, if differential
effects are real, or can be clearly implied from the way a statute or ordinance is
drafted, the Court will presume that state action is unconstitutional. The Court
increasingly has equated any amount of differential effect with impermissible
discrimination. Once such "discrimination" is found, it is virtually impossible for the
state to justify the differential treatment.

19. Although the text of the Constitution speaks explicitly only of granting Congress power "to
regulate commerce," that document long has been understood also to prohibit the states from regulating

so as improperly to infringe on interstate commercial interests. Defining what sort of situations constitute
improper state interference is what the dormant Commerce Clause case law is about.
20. Professor T.R. Powell's aphorism regarding the inconsistencies in the Court's dormant Commerce
Clausejurisprudence remains pertinent. In his mock Restatement of Constitutional Law, Powell suggested

that the Court's decisions in dormant Commerce Clause cases should be restated along the following
lines: "Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce. The states have the power to regulate

interstate commerce too, but not too much. Comment: How much is too much is beyond the scope of
this Restatement." Quoted in Thomas M. Lockney, Probable Causefor Nighttime, No-Knock Drug
Searches: The Illusion of Judicial Control in North Dakota, 69 N.D. L. REV. 613, 625 (1993).
21. See also Stanley E. Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light of Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky as Case Study in the
Waste Wars, 83 Ky. U. 551, 556-58, 564-601 (1994-95) [hereinafter Cox, What May States Do?].
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A. Philadelphia'sTwo-Tiered Approach
The move toward determinative heightened scrutiny began in Philadelphiav. New
Jersey,' the Court's seminal waste and dormant Commerce Clause case. In
Philadelphia,the Court rejected New Jersey arguments that waste is like quarantined
goods which a state may ban at its borders. Instead, the Court focused on the
differential treatment given to in-state versus out-of-state generated waste. Since New
Jersey did not treat in-state generated waste like a normally quarantined item, but
instead let it leave the state or go to any number of properly permitted facilities
within the state, out-of-state generated waste had to be allowed similar access to
private waste processing facilities. The reality of New Jersey's waste ban seemed to
the Court designed to protect only from the harms of out-of-state waste, rather than
against the harms of waste per se. In-state waste was alleged to be no less harmful
than out-of-state waste, but the in-state waste was not penalized when it tried to go
into a New Jersey landfill. If the state was unwilling to fully internalize, via penalty
placed on in-state products, the full costs and burdens of in-state generated waste, any
regulatory burdens which applied only to out-of-state waste conferred a costless
market advantage to in-state generators.' New Jersey was reserving privately owned
landfill space for New Jersey trash, and denying access to out-of-state generators who
desired access (and who were willing to pay for that access at market rates) to that
same space. New Jersey could not by fiat hoard a privately owned commercial
resource - landfill space - for its own citizens' benefit.
As a shortcut to evaluating the propriety of a regulation, however, the Philadelphia
Court also enshrined into dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence two different tests
by which state regulatory efforts should be measured. Oversimplifying its prior case
law, the Court distinguished between situations where a regulation would be
presumed invalid from situations where it would be presumed valid.
The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness
to the evils of "economic isolation" and protectionism, while at the same
time recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be

22. 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that state ban on importing garbage violates dormant Commerce
Clause in absence of any reason for treating waste differently based on origin).
23. The state alternatively might have been able directly and fully to subsidize some or all of the
burdens and costs associated with in-state waste generation without violating the dormant Commerce
Clause. See infra notes 54-56, 134-38, and accompanying text and infra note 74 (discussing possibility
of subsidies in relation to limited flow control legislation). As will become clear through text, under the
Court's current tests, only two ways of addressing externalities imposed by interstate business on the local
population, without violating the Commerce Clause, are possible. First, the state may insist that all those
who similarly burden the population internalize the costs associated with their business activities. If this
approach is taken, the regulation requiring internalization must apply evenhandedly to insiders and
outsiders, thereby leaving outsiders no more competitively disadvantaged by the regulation than insiders.
Alternatively, the state may directly ameliorate the harms imposed on its citizens by compensating them
or subsidizing their efforts to ameliorate the harms imposed by interstate business. If this approach is
taken, the resources put in the hands of the insiders must not come disproportionately from outsiders who
have caused regulatory burdens, when both insiders and outsiders are contributing to those burdens.
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unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of
its people. Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by
state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected ....
But where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is
no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a
much more flexible approach, the general contours of which were outlined
in Pike v. Bruce Church ....
Thus was launched Pike versus per se.
Since this issue of which test will be used has assumed determinative significance
in more recent Commerce Clause case law, it is worth emphasizing that although
the PhiladelphiaCourt certainly used the discrimination per se language, it did not
place such emphasis upon the need to first pigeonhole as have more recent
decisions. The PhiladelphiaCourt described the crucial inquiry before it as being
to determine whether the legislation before it was "basically a protectionist measure,
or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns,
with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental."' Such an inquiry
finds out what really is going on rather than rest on labels of differential treatment.
Were differential treatment alone the trigger for invalidity, the PhiladelphiaCourt
should have stopped its analysis once it had identified the fact of differential
treatment. It did not. The PhiladelphiaCourt instead reasoned that New Jersey's
waste ban was doomed for several reasons. First, the state's claimed benefits were
derived solely by discriminating against outsiders. Additionally, the same types
of alleged harms were not treated as such when they came from in-state waste. 7
Finally, New Jersey's ban was, in the Court's view, bad policy for a nation with
shared commercial waste disposal problems. In short, the Philadelphia Court
engaged in real analysis to reach its conclusion of protectionism. It did not

24. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623-24. Further elaborating upon what is required for the Pike test
to be satisfied, the Court quoted from Pike:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed or, such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the e.tent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 624 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
25. Id. at 624. Emph3sizing that New Jersey's waste ban completely isolated New Jersey's private
disposal facilities from the larger waste market, without any allegation that the waste desiring to come
to these facilities was in any way different from New Jersey waste, the Court found this effect of
economic protectionism could not be offset by any "goods" the legislation accomplished for New Jersey
citizens, since all such benefits were accomplished solely at the expense of outsiders. Id. at 626-29.
26. See id. at 628 ("On its face, it imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of
conserving the State's remaining landfill space.") (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 628-29.
28. See id. at 629.
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substitute the label of differential treatment for determining whether there was any
real evil to the regulation.
A per se test that needs thus to be elaborated on, when applied to particular facts,
is not so much a prospective test of unconstitutionality as it is a retrospective
summation of result. "We are declaring your statute unconstitutional because you
impermissibly discriminate against interstate commerce - here's how your statute
impermissibly discriminates" has a very different feel from a Court pronouncement
of "We are declaring your statute unconstitutional because it seems to affect insiders
and outsiders differently - this differential treatment in and of itself constitutes
impermissible discrimination - we do not need to explain further." The Philadelphia Court engaged in the former approach. Nevertheless, the PhiladelphiaCourt's
"virtual per se rule of invalidity" language had a talismanic lure to it which
unfortunately proved irresistible to later panels.' The PhiladelphiaCourt is to be
blamed for inviting this determinative oversimplification into dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence?' Although it would be fourteen years before the Court
would again address waste issues, when it did so, it would, in at least one of those
decisions, employ Philadelphia'stwo- tiered approach in an unhelpfully simplifying
manner.
B. Fort Gratiot'sFortificationof Per Se Implications
In 1992, the Supreme Court issued decisions in two companion garbage cases.
Like Philadelphia, the Court's twin waste decisions primarily rejected state
arguments that the need to facilitate state waste planning requires a loosening of
dormant Commerce Clause case law constraints. Chemical Waste Management v.
Hunt" declared unconstitutional a hazardous waste fee imposed only on out-of-

29. The PhiladelphiaCourt additionally oversimplified the factual situation before it. By likening
the barrier to waste importation as similar to a ban on goods coming into a state, the Court gave too
short shrift to New Jersey's quarantine or in the nature of quarantine arguments. If the problem with solid
waste is that it must be buried or otherwise disposed of somewhere, then a requirement that all waste
generated within New Jersey must be safely buried in a properly maintained landfill is rather like a
quarantine requirement. The harmful item is being destroyed. Additionally, however, if the waste, once
buried, is still not considered safe, as is true for solid waste, since most of its potential for health and
safety harm continues or arises after disposal, then a watchful state eye kept on the disposal sites where
its waste has ended up continues to resemble a quarantine. That the state thus quarantines its own waste
by allowing it to go into disposal sites hardly means that it wishes to accept more such quarantined items
that would increase harm to its own population. The Philadelphia Court implicitly rejected these
arguments.
30. On other waste issues, the Philadelphia Court left many things open. Unaddressed were
possibilities of: (1) market participation ("We express no opinion about New Jersey's power ... to
restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources."); (2) evenhanded regulation which harmed outof-state commerce ("by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though
interstate commerce may incidentally be affected") (emphasis in original); or (3) even permissible
discriminationbased on real differences in dangers posed, if any such differences could be proved to
exist ("unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently") See id. at 626-27
& n.6.
31. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
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state generated waste. 3 2 The case thus reaffirmed, in a situation where there was
no doubt about the severity of the burdens that were being imposed by the out-ofstate waste (because it was hazardous waste), that Philadelphiameant what it said
about not treating waste differently based on where it was generated? 3 If Alabama
allowed its in-state generated hazardous waste to travel freely on its highways and
go to a permitted facility in Alabama, then out-of-state generated hazardous waste
must be allowed access' to the private Alabama waste handling market on the same
terms. This was confirmation of Philadelphia'smessage, and confirmation that there
would be no departure from it.
The message of Fort GratiotSanitaryLandfill v. MichiganDepartmentof Natural
Resources' was even more disheartening to most state waste planners. More
importantly for larger dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, the Fort
Gratiot Court began to push the two-tiered invitation of Philadelphia in more
mechanical and outcome determinative directions. At issue in Fort Gratiot was
whether there could be a reasonable solution to NIMBY35 siting problems. Since

32. See id. at 346.
33. The Alabama Supreme Court basically dared the United States Supreme Court to declare
hazardous waste protected commerce. See Hunt v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1387, 139091 (Ala. 1991) (challenging Supreme Court to so declare). The Court promptly complied, by reversing
the Alabama decision.
34. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
35. The acronym stands for "Not in my backyard," and expresses strong local will that problems
proposed to be thrust on a local community should be borne by someone else. NIMBY's are often
criticized as being parochial or selfish for wishing to thrust their burdens on others. See, e.g., Orlando
E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L. Rev. 198 (1990); cf. Daniel
Mazmanian & David Morell, The "NIMBY" Syndrome: Facility Siting and the Failureof Democratic
Discourse, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTHE 1990's, at 125 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds.,
1990). Nevertheless, as I elsewhere have argued, NIMBYism is arguably rational, and should not be
condemned so much as recognized for its insights about the nature of the externalities created by current
facility siting processes. See Cox, Burying Misconceptions, supra note 13, at 823-25. See generally
MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN ToxIC AND NUCLEAR
WASTE SrrING (1994); BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND THE NIMBY SYNDROME- THE POL1TICS OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING INTHE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1994); Michael B. Gerrard,
The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994); Barry G. Rabe et al, NIMBY and Maybe:
Conflict and Cooperationin the Siting of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilitiesin the United
States and Canada,24 E'vrL. L. 68 (1994). First, to the extent that local opponents desire no one to
bear the burdens others are attempting to thrust upon them, there is as much altruism as selfishness
involved, or at least the argument primarily is about whether the type of burdens attempted should be
imposed, rather than aboit who should bear them. The phrase NIABY ("Not in anyone's backyard") has
sometimes been used to eescribe such advocates. See Sarah Crim, The NIMBY Syndrome in the 1990s:
Where Do You Go After Getting to 'No'?, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 132, 133 (May 4, 1990). In the local
waste disposal context particularly, it may be sound policy to advocate less land disposal in favor of
recycling, less waste generation, and alternative treatment methods. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 256.31(e)
(1991) (emphasizing that land disposal is least preferred RCRA method of dealing with waste). Second,
to the extent that so-called "NIMBY's" are being asked disproportionatelyto bear burdens created or
caused primarily by cthers, it seems reasonable to expect them to complain. The real "NIMBY's" are
those who did not bear their own burdens, but are instead attempting to thrust them upon a different local
community. In the modern waste disposal context it is because waste is primarily coming from outsiders
that burdens seem especially unfair to those being asked to bear them. Michigan's statute was an attempt
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the Michigan statute involved was being challenged on its face," Michigan
properly argued before the Court that its law should be viewed as concerned with
creating landfill space in the face of local opposition to any disposal facilities the classic NIMBY problem.
Michigan was attacking the selfish kind of NIMBYism, the kind which opposes
any disposal in a local area. To combat such NIMBYism, the Michigan legislation
gave local waste planning boards power to override local zoning or other
ordinances, and thereby force a community to site an unpopular disposal facility, if

the local waste planning board found it necessary or desirable for effective local
waste planning. But the Michigan statute balanced this loss of local control and

imposition of local burdens by also giving the local community the power to
exclude burdens that it didn't create. The local community could exclude out-of-area
trash from any facilities so sited. This policy struck a reasonable balance for
ensuring that local communities would accept their own waste disposal burdens
without becoming dumping grounds for others' burdens. The Supreme Court,
however, declared the Michigan statute unconstitutional.
In some respects, the Court's Fort Gratiot decision was consistent with prior
Commerce Clause reasoning. When Michigan contended that there could be no
significant discrimination against interstate commerce because not all Michigan
counties excluded out-of-area waste, the Court correctly countered that real
discrimination, however small, cannot be ignored.37 In response to Michigan's
claims that discrimination against out-of-area waste (including therefore
discrimination against other Michigan waste) was not discrimination against

interstate waste, the Court correctly opined that discrimination by a state's sub-units,
acting in concert, can effectively accomplish what would clearly be unconstitutional
if done by the state directly. These were noncontroversial reaffirmations of

to promote local siting over truly selfish NIMBY opposition, by giving the local community the right
to condition the siting on ability to exclude burdens it did not create.
36. Since this was so, if any reasonable set of facts could support the statute, the statute would have
to be upheld.
37. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361-63. The Court has addressed this point in other fact situations.
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) (holding that Oklahoma requirement that coal
burning utilities in Oklahoma use 10% Oklahoma-mined coal in their operations discriminates per se
against interstate commerce, and cannot be successfully defended under heightened scrutiny test, even
though impact on overall coal market is small); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 27677 (1988) (rejecting, in context of tax credit for Ohio produced ethanol, argument that amount of
discrimination against out-of-state commerce should be offset against purported beneficial environmental
effects or purpose); cf., e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981) (indicating no need to
determine amount of discrimination before finding discrimination invalid).
38. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361-63. As support for this proposition, the Court cited and
analyzed Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (city requirement that all milk be
pasteurized within five miles from the city center held to discriminate against interstate commerce, even
though other in-state interests similarly adversely affected) and Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891)
(imposition of special inspection fees on meat sold more than 100 miles from place of slaughter held to
discriminate against interstate commerce). Arguably, the situation in Fort Gratiot was distinguishable
from either case. Milk pasteurizers in Madison (Dean Milk), and slaughterhouses in Virginia (Rebman),
by insisting on a geographical limit for sale, were ensuring themselves a steady customer base for their
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principles from previously well-established case law.
Fort Gratiot modified dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, by
increasing the need to decide which test should be used, at the expense of
meaningfully inquiring into how much burden is imposed on interstate commerce.
Thus, the Court viewed Michigan's point about the relatively small amount of
burden on the interstate waste industry as irrelevant to the balance for Commerce
Clause purposes. In the Court's view, if the county was discriminating at all, no
weighing of benefits and burdens needed to be conducted. Michigan's position was
that its clearly legitimate local purpose - the encouragement of responsible waste
disposal - should be weighed against whatever minimal harms were imposed on
interstate commerce. Such a deferential balancing would be permissible under the
Pike test, a test that Michigan argued was appropriate when discrimination is
incidental to legitimate local regulation. The Court, however, found the Pike test
inapplicable where differential impact, however small or unintended, on out-of-state
business is clear.
The problem with the Court's insistence that it evaluate either under a deferential
Pike or a presumptively unconstitutional per se test is that it is not always clear
which test should apply, yet the test becomes nearly determinative of the result. If
the Pike test is used, the presumption will be that the statute should stand, until and
unless the opponent can demonstrate that alternatives which burden commerce less
can still accomplish the state's goals. Under the per se test, however, the state must
demonstrate that there are no other alternatives available which can accomplish the
state's legitimate goals. The inevitable result is that advocates in waste battles, as
in other Commerce Clause controversies, spend most of their energy fighting over
which test should apply, because the Court has hinged almost everything on that
categorization.
In Fort Gratiot,Michigan's legislation did not discriminate on its face against outof-state interests. The petitioner, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, was making a facial
rather than an "as applied" challenge. Therefore, the landfill was offering the Court
no evidence as to whether Michigan counties' ability to exclude out-of-area waste
would lead to less or more commercial land filling. Recall that Michigan did not
concede that its regulation was discriminatory either in purpose or effect against
interstate commerce. The state instead contended that its regulation was motivated

services. A requirement prohibiting waste from entering the area (Fort Gratiot) instead decreases the
amount of business that the local landfill will be able to process. Additionally, in the milk and meat
situations, perhaps local areas, if assured that there would be no out-of-state competition, might prefer
a small but guaranteed slice of the pie to the possibility that open access would allow out-of-staters to
completely dominate the in-state market. In the garbage situation, however, to "hoard" landfill resources
at a state-wide level, via county bans, would require that more landfills be created in the other in-state
localities deprived of access to the county landfill space "hoarded" by the particular Michigan county
involved in Fort Gratiol. Whereas, in Philadelphia,the entire state (New Jersey) theoretically could send
all of its garbage to one unfortunate county within the state (since the New Jersey ban was state-wide),
in Fort Gratiot,a county ban on waste would only completely exclude out-of-state waste if all Michigan
counties create landfills and if all Michigan counties are willing to ban all out-of-county trash. The Fort
Gratiot Court apparently considered these differences unimportant to the Commerce Clause inquiry.
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by legitimate environmental concerns, and that the legislation affected in-state
interests as severely as out-of-state concerns. Unlike the charades of legitimate local
purpose, which the Court unmasked as economic protectionism in cases like Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,39 Dean Milk Co. v. City of
4
Madison,' or even in Philadelphia,
Michigan was potentially capable of showing
that its legislation neither displaced nor severely harmed the interstate waste
market.42 Nevertheless, by labeling the legislation discriminatory, the Court
effectively short-circuited any further inquiry into what the legislation actually
accomplished. Once the legislation was "found" (because of its authorization of
differential treatment) to discriminate, it did not matter whether its actual effects
harmed or benefitted the out-of-state waste market.
Such an approach seems potentially wrong-headed as to why there should be a
virtual per se rule of unconstitutionality. The purpose of dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny should not be primarily to prevent states from declaring improper things,
nor to preserve a formality of evenhandedness at all costs. It would seem rather that

39. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). In Hunt, North Carolina prohibited any grade markings being placed on
apples other than USDA grades. The purported legitimate local purpose was to reduce consumer
confusion. But the only apples which apparently had grade markings other than USDA were Washington
apples, and the grade markings used by Washington seemed by any objective standard unlikely to create
consumer confusion. Accordingly, the Court found no legitimate local purpose being achieved in light
of the discriminatory effect demonstrated. See id. at 351-54. The real reason for the North Carolina
regulation apparently was to increase marketing costs for out-of-state competitors, thereby benefitting
North Carolina apple growers. See id. at 351-52.
40. 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Dean Milk involved the city of Madison, Wisconsin's attempt to protect
local milk processors from out-of-state dairy competition. The city passed an ordinance requiring that
all milk sold for human consumption in Madison be pasteurized and bottled within five miles from the
center of the city. Since the ordinance applied to all milk regardless of point of origin, it was technically
facially neutral. The Court, however, correctly had no trouble discerning through the rhetoric of public
health protection that the real effect and purpose of the ordinance was economic protection for local
businesses. See id. at 354. The possibility of fairly easily implementing less discriminatory alternatives,
such as charging for inspection costs to insure milk quality, convinced the Court that the mileage
limitations were unrelated to the purported legitimate local benefit and instead only served the purpose
of keeping competitors away from milk which local businesses desired to process. See id. at 354-56.
41. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see supranotes 22-30 and accompanying text.
To the extent New Jersey, in the Philadelphia case, was depriving extant landfills of the ability to
contract for already permitted landfill space with the highest bidder, the PhiladelphiaCourt may properly
have been smoking out economic protectionist motivations in the state regulation.
42. By encouraging the siting of landfills in Michigan communities which otherwise would not
allow them to come into being, and thereby taking competitive pricing pressure off the general waste
market because of this increased capacity, it could be argued that Michigan's regulations actually
increased the amount of disposal business that would be conducted overall (by allowing more landfilling
to go on in Michigan than otherwise would). At the same time it could also credibly be argued that the
economic burden on waste generators outside Michigan was decreased (by easing the supply side
pressure on prices because of a limited number of other extant disposal sites). Since the challenge to
Michigan's regulatory system was facial, one must imagine such factual scenarios for purposes of arguing
the merits of the litigation. The Court insisted, however, that impermissible economic discrimination was
occurring, yet thought it unnecessary to take any evidence on this issue. See FortGratiot,504 U.S. at
371 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for foreclosing the state's opportunity "to
present evidence on the economic, environmental, and other effects of its legislation").
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the reason for a short-cut test, with short cuts based on reasonably clear intent or
strongly differential impact, is that improper intent or strongly disproportionate
impact usually results in impermissible effect.43 Without probability of
constitutionally suspect economic harm, there should be no constitutional foul.
Expanding the per se test to include more and more gray area situations means that
the perceived likelihood of differential treatment, regardless of how small or why
motivated, becomes a substitute for inquiry about impermissible effects.
I have no quarrel with the Court placing a presumption against the state in
suspected differential harm situations where it would be difficult to determine
exactly what the state legislation causes or accomplishes. A presumption of
unconstitutionality would break the tie where exact effects are unknown or
unknowable. But in situations where the state offers to prove that its legislation
causes no appreciable harm, locking the state into virtual per se invalidity seems
unduly restrictive. 'The current version of the per se test nevertheless raises a nearly
irrebuttablepresumption of invalidity. Only if the state can show that there are no
alternative ways of accomplishing the legitimate state purpose will the differential
treatment be allowed to stand. The state is thus foreclosed from presenting any
evidence that its legitimate purposes are more effectively or less expensively
accomplished via the differential treatment, and that the differential treatment is
therefore a necessary side effect of focusing upon the best way to accomplish a
legitimate regulatory purpose. 4 Differential treatment, regardless of how unintended, and regardless of how necessary and unavoidable a side effect in connection
with accomplishing important state goals, becomes the evil which must be
eradicated under the dormant Commerce Clause.
In the Fort Gratiotcase, Jabeling Michigan's regulatory efforts discriminatory on
their face perhaps meant only that the Court was unwilling to explore how much
economic harm would be caused by Michigan's legislation, and that, at the same
time, the Court was convinced that the legislation would result in an unacceptable
level of such harm. It would have been better to say this explicitly than to foreclose
the state, via an overbroad and absolutely determinative test, from attempting in
other situations to regulate differentially where such regulation might be more
warranted.
Besides expanding and more mechanically applying the per se test, the Fort
GratiotCourt concomitantly reshaped the Court's virtual representation doctrine so
that it would not apply to differential treatment situations.45 This essentially

43. Even strong proponents of viewing the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as
designed to strike regulations for discriminatory intent do not argue to the contrary. See, e.g., Smith,
supra note 7, at 1239-52. To borrow Professor Smith's borrowed imagery, while it may be true that even
a dumb dog can distinguish being kicked with malice from being accidentally stepped on, there is no
constitutional harm in not kicking the canine but instead merely callipg it a mangy mutt as you pass it
by. Cf. id. at 1251.
44. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-02

(1994). This is wrong-headed, because it ends up inviting courts to play games with the definition of
differential treatment ratier than assess the extent of the evil of differential treatment.
45. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 370
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terminated that doctrine's effectiveness as a potential counter to Commerce Clause
attacks. Under the virtual representation rationale, the presence of in-state interests
which are significantly harmed by a state's regulation could indicate two things,
either of which might defuse Commerce Clause skepticism about the propriety of
state regulation.' First, the presence of the significantly harmed insiders might
confirm that the primary purpose of the state regulation is to legitimately regulate
rather than advantage insiders at the expense of outsiders. For example, if there are
significant in-state interests that wish to drive wide trucks on the state's highways,
prohibiting such driving is a true "cost" borne by insiders. Presumably such costs
are not undertaken except when the need to regulate is more pressing than letting
insiders do what ihey otherwise would want.47 A second way to emphasize this
point is to view the significantly harmed insiders as proxy for out-of-state interests
similarly adversely affected. Insiders who wish to drive wide trucks would be
thought to make the same arguments that outsiders would make. Thus, the outsiders'
interests are virtually represented by the harmed insiders.
In Fort Gratiot,however, the Court insisted that any differential effect could not
be counterbalanced by similar harm inflicted on insiders. The fact that Detroit
residents would be deprived of Fort Gratiot's sanitary services was no answer to the
reality that Chicago waste also could not make its way to that Michigan landfill. By
rejecting Michigan's claim that virtual representation applies in differential treatment
situations, the Fort GratiotCourt relegated the virtual representation doctrine to the
sidelines of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Instead of serving to counter
discrimination arguments, virtual representation, after Fort Gratiot,serves only to
confirm the legitimacy of evenhanded regulation.
This is not to say that virtual representation arguments should automatically and
effectively counter Commerce Clause discrimination arguments. Commentators who
have attacked virtual representation rationale correctly have emphasized that the
combination of in-state interests both harmed and benefitted by a state regulation

(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (raising arguments of virtual representation that majority, by ignoring,
rejected).
46. See generally, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Local Politics of Acid Rain: Public Versus Private
Decisionmaking and the Dormant Commerce Clause in a New Era of Environmental Law, 75 B.U. L.

REV. 689 (1995) (proposing more use of virtual representation doctrine to overcome Commerce Clause
objections); cf. Eule, supra note 7 (emphasizing that Commerce Clause should only strike down
undemocratic actions which disproportionately burden outsiders); Tushnet, supra note 7 (advocating a
version of virtual representation in which Commerce Clause burdens should only be found unconstitutional when imposed on those not represented in the legislature).
47. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (using
insiders-harmed argument partially to justify restrictions on truck width and weight).
48. On other issues, Fort Gratiotreaffirmed messages from Philadelphia. The Court described the
case as raising "a rather narrow issue" dealing with nonhazardous waste, and not foreclosing market
exemption arguments on different facts. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 358. The Court repeated
Philadelphia language about the possibilities for discriminatory regulations being upheld if real

differences could be shown in waste based on geographic origin. See id. at 366-67. Additionally, in the
companion Chemical Waste Management case, the Court continued to endorse the idea that evenhanded
methods of regulation would be upheld, even if these might impose significant burdens on interstate
commerce. See Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344-46 (1992).
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can never completely represent the interests of outsiders solely harmed by the
regulation 49 If in-state harms are tolerated at least partly because the trade-off for
benefits is being borne at least partly, or maybe even primarily, by out-of-staters,
there is no virtual representation so far as the amount of harm is concerned. Virtual
representation arguments proceed, however, on the assumption that it is not the
amount of harm with which dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny primarily should
be concerned. The emphasis instead is on state sovereignty, the belief being that a

state should not be penalized for side effects of its regulation on outsiders, so long
as the adverse effect on insiders is clear. This makes sense if the dormant

Commerce Clause is meant to serve primarily as a check on the rationality and
intent of the rule-maker. If the sovereign state intended no harm to outsiders, and
if its regulatory impetus was genuine, the regulation should stand under a virtual
representation rationale. A dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence which puts

virtual representation reasoning at its center focuses on the legitimacy of state
regulation from the insider's perspective.

The Court in the last twenty years, however, increasingly has focused its dormant
Commerce Clause attention away from the rationality or intent of a state regulation,
and instead has concentrated on the regulation's effects, intended or otherwise, on
outside interests. The development in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty" and its progeny of
internal and external consistency tests is one manifestation of this shift to effects
and away from the legitimacy of intentions. Refusal in the courts to embrace virtual

representation doctrine might also be consistent with this trend.
One need not disagree with this move toward effects-based tests to nevertheless
argue that virtual representation doctrine still might serve some role in countering
discrimination arguments. Granted, the virtual representation doctrine should not

protect a regulation from further meaningful scrutiny. But shouldn't the fact that
insiders do indeed suffer effects similar to what is felt by outsiders count for
something in the dormant Commerce Clause balance? This holds true only if

49. See, e.g., Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Losing Face but Gaining Power: State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce, 16 VA. TAX L. REv. 347, 388-410 (1997) [hereinafter Twyman, State Taxation].
50. 467 U.S. 638 (1984). The Court held that an exemption from a wholesaling tax imposed on instate manufacturers who both manufacture and sell in-state discriminates against out-of-state wholesalers
who sell in-state, regardless of the fact that the manufacturing tax is higher than the wholesaling tax and
regardless of lack of proof that an out-of-state wholesaler bears a total tax burden higher than the in-state
manufacturer/wholesaler. See id. at 642-46. The Court instead applied an internal consistency test under
which a hypothetical situation is imagined of all states adopting similar taxing schemes: if multiple tax
burdens against out-of-state interests would occur, the tax is discriminatory. See id. The internal
consistency test was criticized at the time of its development and continues to have serious academic
detractors. See generally, e.g., PHILIP HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION §
2:19 (Supp. 1985); Fitzgerald, supra note 13; C. James Judson & Susan G. Duffy, An Opportunity
Missed: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, A Retreatfrom Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W. VA.
L. REv. 723 (1985); Rob rt G. Lathrop, Armco - A Narrow and Puzzling Test for DiscriminatoryState
Taxes Under the Commerce Clause, 63 TAXES 551 (1985); cf. Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal
Consistency" Foolish?:Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87
MICH. L. REv. 138 (1983) (arguing that fair apportionment would be a more coherent and predictable
way to address multiple burden problems).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/7

1997]

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

dormant Commerce Clause analysis actually is always conducted as some sort of
balancing of interests and effects. Under a balancing approach, significant evidence
of virtual representation could weigh against fairly minimal effect on outsiders. But
the Fort Gratiot Court rejected balancing in any situation where differential
treatment of out-of-staters is authorized. By completely rejecting virtual representation arguments in differential treatment situations, the Fort GratiotCourt removed
the doctrine from the very place its adherents feel use of the rationale would be
most justified. If effects felt on outsiders cannot be countered by looking to the
significance of effects on insiders, the guts of virtual representation have been
removed. The theme of illegitimacy of differential treatment completely triumphs
over asking why there is differential treatment or asking how much differential
treatment is occurring.
C. Pushing PerSe Further in Oregon Waste and Carbone
Illegitimacy of differential treatment was more explicitly the Court's dominant
theme two years later in Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality," a case which narrowed, if it did not eliminate, possibilities for Commerce Clause exemption via the compensatory fee doctrine. To
appreciate what is foreclosed by this decision, it is important to emphasize how little
the state of Oregon was requesting, as compared to previous Court garbage
decisions. Oregon was not banning waste either at its borders or at county borders,
as in Philadelphiaor Fort Gratiot. Nor was Oregon attempting to collect money
solely from outsiders, while letting in-state waste go free, as in Chemical Waste.
Instead, Oregon wished merely to collect for the actual harms caused to Oregon by
the disposal of out-of-state waste in Oregon. Dollar for dollar, if Oregon had
already dedicated funds in regard to burdens associated with in-state generated
waste, Oregon asked that out-of-state waste pay to Oregon the same amounts when
that waste came to rest at an Oregon landfill, since that out-of-state waste thereby
started to impose burdens on Oregon. The Court ruled Oregon's dollar for dollar
equalization scheme discriminatory per se and hence unconstitutional.
Key to the Court's analysis was that out-of-state waste received differential
treatment at the landfill gate. Out-of-state waste paid a special add-on tipping fee;
in-state waste did not. Oregon's best argument to justify its fee was that the state
could not tax out-of-state citizens. Only their waste could be taxed when it came
from out-of-state. Oregon's tax on out-of-state waste thus effectively was on a
different type of waste - the kind generated by noncitizens farther up the waste
chain.' In regard to that out-of-state waste, Oregon wished to collect what it had
already dedicated from general revenues to addressing waste problems caused by
in-state waste. Those in-state revenues, the state credibly could argue, should be
counted as coming from in-state generators, since all Oregonians would be

51. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
52. I previously have argued for Commerce Clause leeway regarding differential state regulation
when the state cannot easily regulate the entire waste stream. See Cox, Burying Misconceptions,supra
note 13, at 827-29.
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presumed to produce some in-state waste. All Oregonian generators had thus

collectively voted to spend their state's money to address the harms of their in-state
generated waste. Despite these arguments, the Court applied heightened scrutiny,

and refused to allow Oregon to count its overall revenue program for in-state
generated waste against the fee charged to out-of-state waste disposed of in Oregon.

The Court instead insisted that only monies collected in regard to a particular instate waste could be offset against fees charged to out-of-state waste. 3
By focusing solely on waste at the tipping gate, the Court required that Oregon
restructure its taxing and revenue system if it wished to subsidize in-state generated
waste. The implications of this ruling are potentially far-reaching regarding state
budgeting and policy making. After Oregon Waste, and after West Lynn Creamery,

Inc. v. Healy," a non-waste case decided the same term,5 it is clear that states
must craft all tax and revenue measures very carefully to avoid unconstitutionality.
If dedicated funds are created that come partly from funds contributed by outsiders
but which solely benefit insiders, Commerce Clause attacks are possible. 6 The
Oregon Waste Court's emphasis on the need for absolutely evenhanded taxing
schemes has already been confirmed in a relatively noncontroversial differential
taxing case decided in February 1996,5 and extended in a more controversial

53. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99, 104, 108.
54. 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (holding that a milk assessment assessed evenhandedly upon all milk sold
for the first time in Massachusetts nevertheless violates the dormant Commerce Clause, when the entire
assessment scheme reveal3 that the amount of assessment is tied to the expected amount of product
received from out-of-state, and when all revenue raised from the assessment is targeted solely to
subsidize in-state milk producers).
55. The West Lynn case receives additional treatment later in this article. See infra notes 134-38 and
accompanying text.
56. This was the situation in West Lynn. The mirlk assessment in that case went only to in-state dairy
farmers but was collected on all milk sold or processed in Massachusetts. Furthermore, the amount of
the assessment was calculated based on the expected proportion of milk that would be produced out-ofstate. The assessment then went directly to the Massachusetts dairy farmers rather than into general
revenues. The West Lynn Court reasoned that such an assessment was not a general revenue tax, which
could be collected disproportionately from outsiders without violating the Commerce Clause. Since these
milk assessment funds instead never went into general revenues, they were never available for other
purposes than to prop up Massachusetts dairy farmers. The funds could also therefore not properly be
considered a subsidy. According to the West Lynn Court's reasoning, since the revenues never went into
the general fund and thus were never raised for the benefit of the general populace, the assessment was
impermissibly targeted against outsiders for the benefit of insiders.
In order for a subsidy to pass dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny post-West Lynn, the funds used for
the benefit of insiders must not be linked to funds collected from outsiders of a similar type and then
passed through back to th,. insiders. In the context of garbage subsidies to insiders to help reduce their
costs of waste disposal, or for the local government to ensure that locally generated waste goes where
the government wishes it to, I have explored these points in greater detail elsewhere. See Cox, What May
States Do?. supra note 21, at 586-90. Cf. infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (discussing fees
collected from local generators which the government then tries to target for flow control purposes).
57. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996) (confirming Oregon Waste's curtailment
of expansive interpretations of the compensatory tax doctrine by holding intangibles tax which exempts
in-state corporations unconstitutional); cf General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997) (holding
that regulated monopolist utilities which provide bundled natural gas to consumers via direct pipes to
their homes may receive different tax treatment regarding the natural gas thus sold than out-of-state spot
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property tax case decided by the Court in May 1997.58 The current Court's message
is that tax exemption and fund distribution situations are as suspect as other dormant
Commerce Clause situations.
The Court thus used Oregon Waste both to restrict rather than expand its
compensatory fee doctrine, and also to link tax and regulatory dormant Commerce
Clause case law. Under the compensatory fee doctrine, a state may charge out-ofstate items a fee that merely compensates for fees already assessed against the same
kind of in-state goods. The classic example of a compensatory fee is a use tax
placed against goods purchased out-of-state and brought back into the state. If such
goods would have been assessed a sales tax had they been purchased in-state, the
Court has allowed a use tax to be placed on the goods equal to the amount of the
sales tax otherwise avoided. 9 Oregon Waste emphasized that such use taxes were
the only compensatory taxes that the Court has upheld in recent years, and that the
Court opposes expanding categories subject to compensatory tax justification.'
Furthermore, the Court, in a somewhat inaccurate characterization of prior case law,
announced that

providers of natural gas who sell natural gas to in-state consumers).
58. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997). The issue in this
case was whether a Maine property tax deduction, limited to charitable organizations which serve
primarily Maine residents, violates the dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 1593-94. The Court,
applying heightened scrutiny, held that failure to give the same tax break to camps which serve out-ofstaters as given to camps serving in-staters discriminates against interstate commerce. See id. at 15961608. In line with the analysis of recent garbage precedents in text, the Camps Court emphasized that
once discrimination is found to exist, the issue is not how much detrimental effect on interstate commerce
will be tolerated, but rather whether the tax can be justified as the only way to accomplish a legitimate
local purpose. See id. at 1601 & nn.15-16, 1602.
The Court also rejected town arguments that the tax break was the equivalent of market participation
or subsidy. See id. at 1604-07. The town, according to the Court, was not purchasing needed social
services by granting a tax break. See id. at 1607. To so rule, the Court feared, would dangerously expand
market participation exemption possibilities. See id. Although full consideration of the Camps Court's
constitutional line drawing between regulatory tax measures on the one hand and potentially exempt
market subsidies/market participation on the other is beyond the scope of this article, the Camps Court's
approach of limiting rather than expanding loopholes is in line with the points made in text. For more
on the dangers of running counter to Court skepticism about expanding market participation exemption,
see infra notes 119-80 (criticizing Second and Third Circuit flow control decisions which misapply
market participation exemption).
59. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-87 (1937). See generally Walter
Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to UnconstitutionalState Tax Discrimination,39 TAx
LAW. 405 (1986).
60. See Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 105 (1994). It is worth
asking why even the use/sales tax situation satisfies dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny under a per se
discrimination standard. The use tax is aimed only at goods which were purchased out-of-state and seems
designed to dissuade consumers from seeking a competitive advantage by buying from out-of-state
businesses. The consumer's state should not have power to tax out-of-state business activity absent
purposeful connection by the seller with the taxing state. Nevertheless, continuing to uphold the
compensatory tax exception in use tax situations is justified, even under a per se presumption against its
constitutionality, under the rationale that the tax is on sales to the forum state, the reality being that the
goods were sold to be used there. Cf 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION 16-18 (1992) (discussing use tax situations more generally).
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Though our cases sometimes discuss the concept of the compensatory
tax as if it were a doctrine unto itself, it is merely a specific way of
justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means."
The Court thus reinterpreted the compensatory fee doctrine as a special and unique
case where heightened scrutiny might be satisfied. The Court thereby extended the
trend begun in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesy62 of holding taxing statutes to the same
presumptions of unconstitutionality as regulatory measures, when there is evidence
of differential impact.
Evaluating tax and regulatory cases under a single dormant Commerce Clause
standard may well be desirable, but it is not the way most commentators and courts
have approached these problemsY It was thus inaccurate of the Oregon Waste
Court to characterize prior case law as having always applied a single standard for
both tax and regulation cases. More importantly, however, the recharacterization in
Oregon Waste moves only in the direction of restricting state ability to act. The
standard around which Oregon Waste unifies dormant Commerce Clause analysis
is a standard that focuses on effects more than intentions, and which penalizes a
state for differential unintended effects, regardless of how small they are or how
much good is otherwise accomplished." Perhaps these messages were not
unanticipated, but before Oregon Waste, they had not been so unambiguously stated.
The Oregon Waste Court made similar inroads, through dicta, on use of the user
fee doctrine to justify differential assessments. The user fee doctrine allows states
to charge out-of-state entities reasonable amounts for services the state provides to
outsiders and for which in-staters have already paid via general tax or other
revenues. In Oregon Waste, the Court rejected Oregon's attempts to apply user fee
case law to justify its tax on out-of-state waste generators, emphasizing that the
potentially more lenient justifications present in user fee case law would be

61. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 102. This was certainly an inaccurate characterization so far as older
compensatory tax cases are concerned. See, e.g., Philip M. Tatarowicz and Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde,
An Analytical Approach to State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REv.
879, 909 (1986) (emphasizing that older Court decisions allow different types of taxes to be considered

complementary).
62. 467 U.S. 638 (1984); see also supra note 50.
63. See, e.g., Twyman, State Taxation, supra note 49, at 400-04 and sources there cited (indicating
that the tax and regulatory lines of cases have not been driven by the same constitutional concerns).
64. As the majority f mphasized: "As we use the term here, 'discrimination' simply means differential

treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.
If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid." Oregon Waste, 511 U.S.
at 99 (citations omitted). The Court also stated: "Our cases require that justifications for discriminatory
restrictions on commerce pass the 'strictest scrutiny.' The State's burden of justification is so heavy that
'facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect."' Id. at 115 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 337 (1979)).
The Oregon Waste di:;sent argued that a fourteen cents'per week effect on interstate commerce was
so minimal that the legitimacy of Oregon's purpose should clearly outweigh this effect. See Oregon
Waste, 511 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This argument fell on deaf majority ears. See id.

at 100 n.4.
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henceforward inapplicable in compensatory fee cases.' The Oregon Waste Court
additionally limited user fee logic to state-owned facilities,' apparently linking the
doctrine to the deferentifi treatment given states under the market participant
exemption.' This in itself would be an important but perhaps not illogical
restructuring of user fee doctrine,' but the Court went further onto questionable
ground. As Justice Rehnquist protested in dissent,' the majority indicated in illadvised dicta that even user fees associated with state-owned facilities could not
"discriminate" against interstate commerce." If discrimination in future user fee
cases is defined to be merely differential effect, as it was so defined in Oregon
Waste,7 user fees will be subject to much more searching scrutiny than has
formerly been the case.'

65. See id. at 102 n.6.
66. See id. The Court arguably incorrectly characterized the fees Oregon charged. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), for example, the Court more properly identified
user fee logic with "state-owned or state-provided ... services" (emphasis added). Id. at 621. Justice
Thomas, in his footnote for the Court in Oregon Waste, however, argued that because Oregon did not
own the landfills into which waste was headed, this prohibited Oregon from charging user fees. See
Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 103 n.6. This ignores the fact that state inspectors, state clean up efforts, and
other state services would be necessitated by the presence of a privately owned landfill, and that the cost
of such "state provided services" might be proportionally related to the volumes of waste the landfill
accepts.
67. See infra notes 161-80 and accompanying text for more discussion of the market participant
exemption.
68. A rationale for linking user fee logic to market participation logic would be that the state's fees
for services provided are for services which the state is not required to provide, and which therefore it
can sell to its customers at differential rates, preferring one set of customers over another.
69. See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
70. See id. at 102 n.6.
71. See i. at 99.
72. Even in the same term in which Oregon Waste was decided, the Court did not so apply the
doctrine. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355 (1994). In Northwest Airlines,
the Court held that Grand Rapids airport user fees imposed at a different rate on national airlines than
on general aviation traffic did not discriminate against interstate commerce where fees seemed roughly
to approximate the cost of actual use of the facility. See id. at 372-74. The fact that a surplus was
generated was held not to invalidate consideration of the fees as user fees rather than purely revenue
raising measures. See id. at 371-72. For more detailed background on the airport rate-setting issues raised
by Northwest Airlines, see, e.g., Rise J. Peters, Comment, Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent,
Michigan: More Than You Ever Wanted to Know About Airport Ratesetting, Part One (Pricingin the
Courts), 22 Transp. L.J. 291 (1994).
A requirement of no differential impact in state user fee situations would be a significant departure
from previous precedent. Hopefully the dicta in Oregon Waste about lack of discrimination means no
more than that the state may not charge differentially to similarly situated persons for services which the
state requiresthat all persons, in-staters or out-of-staters, must subscribe to in order to meet state health
and safety requirements. For optional services, which the state has no duty to provide to out-of-staters,
but which the state wishes to subsidize by funding, the state should be able to favor its own in receipt
of (including differential pricing for access to) those services. Even when the state requires all who
operate within its regulatory ambit to pay for state services via a user fee (e.g., for inspection costs
associated with health and safety concerns), the inquiry should not be, as apparently is the case in
costless regulatory situations or in revenue raising tax assessments, whether there is indirect differential
effect on out-of-state competitors. Rather, as in NorthwestAirlines, the inquiry should be, at least so long
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There is tension between the Oregon Waste Court's hasty dicta regarding
discriminatory user fees and the normal market participant exemption granted when
a state uses its own funds to address perceived needs or to benefit its own.
However this tension is eventually resolved, it is clear that the Oregon Waste Court
expanded categories where the per se test will be applied, and closed off potential
loopholes in the compensatory fee doctrine. Oregon Waste is a significant opinion,
not so much for how it prevents state waste planners from capturing through fees
the burdens imposed by out-of-state waste coming into a state's borders, but more
for its indication of the Court's increasingly hostile stance toward situations of
differential treatment. Tax measures which take into account the place from where
persons are benefitted or taxed will almost always be declared unconstitutional
under Oregon Waste's logic. So will measures which, even inadvertently, impose
differential burdens on out-of-state businesses. For the increasing number of factual
situations thus brought within per se scrutiny, Oregon Waste further makes clear
that not even actual reimbursement to the state for services provided can counter the
presumption of unconstitutionality required to be imposed under Oregon Waste's
logic for any differential treatment found to exist, 3 The per se test thus swallows
more and more factual situations where policies and effects are ambiguous so far
as the health of the nation or its citizens is concerned. Although Oregon Waste
should not prevent states from very carefully subsidizing their waste planning,
disposal projects, or other activities,74 the Oregon Waste decision, together with the
other 1994 waste decision, C&A Carbone, to be discussed next, demonstrates the
Court's tightening rather than loosening of Commerce Clause restrictions, primarily
through increasingly rigid application of the per se test.
C&A Carboneis arguably one of the most significant dormant Commerce Clause
waste decisions of the 1990s. Environmentally, it invalidated a form of waste
management - monopoly flow control - which a majority of states had authorized
or adopted," which Congress had assumed was permissible behavior,76 and which
as the collected funds do not go into some specialized fisc designed solely to benefit insiders as in West
Lynn Creamery, merely whether the charged assessment reasonably approximates the state expenses in
providing the required service. For more discussion of user fee logic post-Oregon Waste, see Dan T.
Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L. REv. 795 (1997).
73. It is possible to a-tempt to limit the Oregon Waste per se presumptions and logic to situations
of facially differential trerment, since that was the situation before the Oregon Waste Court. Similar
attempts, however, by Justice O'Connor, to limit the internal consistency requirement to situations of
facial discrimination were not endorsed by a majority of the Court. See American Trucking Ass'ns, v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 302-03 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing against majority holding that
flat tax on trucks involvcd in interstate commerce, although facially neutral, discriminates against
interstate commerce because its effect is to disproportionately burden out-of-state interests, and
suggesting that internal ccnsistency apply only to facial discrimination situations).
74. In the context of waste subsidies, I have explained elsewhere how this should be done. See Cox,
What May States Do?, supranote 21, at 586-90. The main requirement for insuring the constitutionality
of a subsidy is that the funds collected to subsidize not be obtained from the competitors of those in-state
business or economic interests being subsidized.
75. See, e.g., Eric S. Petersen & David N. Abramowitz, MunicipalSolid Waste Flow Controlin the
Post-Carbone World, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 361, 364 n.19 (1995) (listing 27 statutes that explicitly
authorized flow control); cf. C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 406 n.l (1994)
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the Court itself had addressed favorably under other clauses of the Constitution at
the height of the Lochner era.' Although a majority of the Court joined Justice
Kennedy's opinion, both Justice O'Connor, concurring, and Justice Souter, (joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun), in dissent, perceived the
Carbone Court to be significantly expanding or misinterpreting prior dormant
Commerce Clause logic and holdings. The case is therefore significant both for
what it has to say on the merits of important waste issues, but more importantly for
its debate among the Justices regarding how dormant Commerce Clause analysis
should be conducted.
The Carbone facts involved a fairly typical flow control ordinance and the
background situation which had led to adoption of that ordinance. 8 To bring the
local community into compliance with federal RCRA requirements, the state
environmental agency had forced the Town of Clarkstown to close its town dump
and look for more environmentally sound ways to ensure proper disposal of its
citizens' waste. The town's solution was to promote construction of a local trdnsfer
station. Rather than build this facility with public dollars or float a bond issue for
such construction, the town made a deal with the proposed builder and operator

(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 21 statutes); Petitioner's Brief at 14 n.8, C&A Carbone (No. 92-1402)
(listing 22 statutes). Nearly all such listings of statutes do not include general "home rule" provisions
under which many municipalities also would have authority to implement flow control in furtherance of
health and safety goals. See, e.g., 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 84 (1979).
76. Prior to Carbone's rejection of this point, there was belief in some quarters that Congress had
not only expected, but already authorized some measure of state flow control. See, e.g., C&A Carbone,
511 U.S. at 407-10 (O'Connor, concurring) (describing RCRA provisions which were alleged to authorize
flow control and conceding that "Congress expected local governments to implement some form of flow
control," but finding that congressional indications were not so specific and unambiguous to constitute
affirmative authorization for state discrimination against interstate commerce). Congress clearly has
power to authorize measures which otherwise would constitute interstate discrimination under the
dormant Commerce Clause, since state Commerce Clause violations only occur in situations where
Congress has not specifically spoken. See, e.g., id. at 409-10. Congress, however, must speak very
explicitly before an affirmative authorization of what would otherwise be unconstitutional will be found.
See, e.g., id. For pre-C&A Carbone commentary expressing doubt about the constitutionality of flow
control measures, compare Ann R. Mesnikoff, Note, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Barrier: Keeping Waste at Home, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1992) (indicating that flow control is
beneficial and that Congress should explicitly authorize it) with Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis:
Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 S.D. L. REv. 529 (1994) (evaluating flow control solely on
basis of consistency with prior Court precedent and concluding that it is unconstitutional).
77. See California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905) (flow control
of garbage to favored franchise upheld against takings and contract clause challenge); Gardner v.
Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (similar flow control measure upheld against substantive due process
challenge).
78. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386-87 (describing the case's background facts); id. at 412-13
(Souter, J., dissenting) (also describing the facts of the case).
79. Many flow control ordinances are used to support publicly owned facilities. As explained in text,
the factual differences between Clarkstown's form of flow control and other flow control regimes seemed
not to play any role in the Court's analysis. It was no accident, for example that the National Association
of Bond Lawyers, a group primarily concerned about the bond ratings involved in publicly financed
facilities supported by flow control arrangements, was seen as an important amicus in the case, and that
their arguments were seen as going to the merits of the controversy before the Court. See id. at 407-10
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of the transfer facility. Its citizens would directly and proportionally finance the
facility through tipping fees set at above market rates. Clarkstown guaranteed that
if enough trash did not come to the facility during the five year contract period, the
town would still pay the higher fees for which the contractor had bid.' Clarkstown
would not be out this money so long as all trash generated by the township ended
up at the facility, since the expected volume of such trash had been used to set the
fees in the contract vith the builder/operator. The above market rate tipping fees
presumably would be passed on to town customers by transporters forced to use the
proposed transfer facility. Clarkstown's flow control ordinance, which prohibited
trash generated in Clarkstown from being transported anywhere else, under threat
of criminal penalty, would ensure that all Clarkstown waste haulers used the
proposed facility. This, if you will, was an example of "mutual coercion mutually
agreed upon."'" The policies behind Clarkstown's flow control package were
simple: Clarkstown would solve its environmental problems via a temporarily
privately owned facility; the facility would be constructed because flow control and
contract guarantees made the deal reasonably attractive to the private sector; and at
the end of the financing period, Clarkstown would own a facility that it could either
lease or operate as a market participant.
Clarkstown's motivations for its flow control arrangement were clearly a mixture
of environmental and financial, with the financial perhaps dominating. It would be
a mistake, however, to hope that a more environmentally motivated flow control
ordinance would have fared better under the C&A Carbone Court's dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. Although the C&A Carbone Court certainly noted and
commented upon the particular financial protection aspects of Clarkstown's
arrangement,' the reasoning of the case was not driven by these facts. The C&A
CarboneJustices evaluated flow control more generically. Justice Souter provided
significant non-economic rationales for flow control in his dissent." Justice
O'Connor emphasized that all forms of flow control, by their nature, evenhandedly
discriminate, and therefore should not be subjected to heightened scrutiny.' The

(O'Connor, J., concurring). Nor was it any misreading of the implications of the C&A Carbone case that
soon following it, the bond ratings for such facilities were seriously reevaluated. See, e.g., Martha M.
Canan, Voters Approve GO Issue in Wake of Carbone Ruling, THE BOND BUYER, November 10, 1994;
Karen Pierog, Two Ohio Waste IncineratorsClose, PartlyDue to May High Court Ruling, THE BOND
BUYER, November 9, 1994; Martha M. Canan, Standard & Poor's Says Flow Control Bill's Death
Probably Won't Affect Bond Ratings, THE BOND BUYER, October 12, 1994 (emphasizing that the
reevaluation occurred after the C&A Carbonedecision and under the assumption that there would be no
congressional "fix").
80. This is known a; a "put or pay" agreement, since the government entity must either "put" the
amount of trash contracted for with the facility, thereby generating its revenue, or "pay" the facility for
any shortfall in volumes and concomitant disposal fees.
81. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243.48 (1968).
82. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394-95.
83. See id. at 419-21, 428-29 (Souter, J., dissenting). For more elaborate explanation of some of the
potential benefits of flow control, see, e.g., Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 75, and Mesnikoff, supra

note 76.
84. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 401-05 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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majority emphasized that the denial of competition inherent in flow control requires
heightened scrutiny, presumably regardless of whether the negotiations leading to
a particular flow control monopoly are "cozy" or conducted at arms length.'
The main debate among the C&A Carbonejustices thus centered on whether flow
control in general, not as exhibited by Clarkstown's particular factual scenario,'
was constitutionally permissible. For the majority, the key objection to flow control
is that it "prevents everyone except the favored local operator from performing the
initial [waste] processing step" and "thus deprives out-of-state businesses of access
to a local market."' Viewing flow control as just "one more instance of local
processing requirements that we long have held invalid,"" the majority dismissed
claims that, because Clarkstown's flow control ordinance foreclosed both local as
well as out-of-state processors from competing with the flow control monopolist,
it should be viewed as nondiscriminatory. For the majority, this prohibition on all
competition merely exacerbated the constitutional harm." According to the
majority, flow control, because it was monopoly flow control, by its very nature
discriminated facially against interstate commerce.'

85. See id. at 389-93.
86. In fact, a fair argument can be made that the justices ignored important facts which argue that
certiorari may have been improvidently granted. See Cox, What May States Do?, supra note 21, at 596
(discussing Carbone's shift in emphasis during briefing to the out-of-state origin of the trash it wished
to process instead of the illegality of flow control per se). When I was advising the attorneys for
Clarkstown on possible responses to Carbone's reply brief, the possibility of asking to dismiss because
certiorari had been improvidently granted was discussed, with counsel for Clarkstown electing instead
to file a sur-reply brief drawing attention to Carbone's change of tactics.
87. C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389.
88. Id at 391.
89. Comparing to previous cases where the Court had found unconstitutional discrimination, the
Carbone majority remarked:
The only conceivable distinction from the cases cited above is that the flow control
ordinance favors a single local proprietor. But this difference just makes the protectionist
effect of the ordinance more acute. In Dean Milk, the local processing requirement at least
permitted pasteurizers within five miles of the city to compete. An out-of-state pasteurizer
who wanted access to that market might have built a pasteurizing facility within the
radius. The flow control ordinance at issue here squelches competition in the wasteprocessing service altogether, leaving no room for investment from outside.
Id. at 392.
90. See id. at 390-93. The majority also introduced via dicta the possibility that a state might be
without regulatory power over its citizens who wish to take advantage of other states' more lax disposal
practices. Responding to arguments that flow control might serve the useful purpose of ensuring that
trash generated in Clarkstown would end up only at truly safe disposal facilities, the C&A Carbone Court
rejected such arguments as "extend[ing] the town's police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds." Id.
at 393. To the extent that Clarkstown's health and safety justifications masked a more economic protectionist purpose, the Court may have been right to expose the nature of what was really going on. See,
e.g., id.. at 392-94. If the dicta were pushed outside of economic protectionist contexts, however, serious
regulatory problems might result. For example, under CERCLA, a municipality that arranges for disposal
of locally generated waste can be held jointly and severally liable for resulting Superfund cleanup costs
at sites where that waste ends up. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
A governmental entity that cannot regulate disposal arrangements it has promoted would be caught in
a catch-22 situation. It is obligated under RCRA and many state plans to arrange for disposal of trash
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It was here that Justice O'Connor parted company with the majority's logic. She
saw prior local processing cases as standing for the more modest proposition that
it is constitutionally impermissible for a community to favor in-town processors as
a group against out-of-area processors. Because a "garbage sorting monopoly is
achieved at the expense of all competitors, be they local or non-local,"'" Justice
O'Connor viewed flow control as "'discriminat[ing]' evenhandedly," and therefore
not subject to the virtual per se rule of invalidity.' The local commercial waste
processing community foreclosed by monopoly of business could be expected to
complain of and feel the effects of Clarkstown's flow control ordinance as much as
out-of-state interests. This demon strated to Justice O'Connor, in line with previous
Court virtual representation cases," that there was no discrimination against out-ofstate commerce." Admitting that there is "no clear line"" separating the
categories of discirimination in which heightened scrutiny is required from those
where the local regulation is given more benefit of the doubt, Justice O'Connor
nevertheless found it important not to expand the categories of per se invalidity to
situations such as Clarkstown's, which involved clear harm to in-state interests and
no preference for in-staters as a group as against outsiders."
Justice Souter even more pointedly disagreed with the majority's use of the
dormant Commerce Clause to strike down monopoly arrangements which a town
has undertaken in its capacity as municipal service-provider, rather than as protector
of local businesses from price competition. Without explicitly so stating, he
apparently viewed the majority's position as bordering dangerously close to
recycling substantive economic due process through the dormant Comnierce Clause.
He emphasized that the Commerce Clause was not designed to protect forms of
business activity, but rather to ensure only that no discrimination in competition is
based on the geographic location of the competitor.' In Justice Souter's view,
because the burden of ensuring safe and efficient trash disposal is so peculiarly and

generated by its citizens, but it is placed potentially liable for improper disposal if it does not arrange
wisely. To be without some power to ensure that waste for whose disposal it has arranged ends up in
a "proper" facility would seem unduly to tie the state's hands. If the Court is serious about establishing
a complete "hands off" approach, that prevents government telling its own citizens what they may do
with their waste once they commit to shipping it out-of-state, then the CERCLA liability and RCRA
obligation rules will have to be relaxed to treat such waste as not within the state's regulatory control
except for the time that tie waste is within the jurisdiction.
91. C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 404 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (emphasis added).

92. Id. (O'Connor, J. concurring).
93. See supra notes 45-50 for discussion of virtual representation rationales.
94. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 403-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 402 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Although she ultimately found that Clarkstown's ordinance unreasonably burdened interstate
commerce under the 1'ike test, she thus felt compelled to write separately to object to the majority's
application of the heightened scrutiny test, terming the distinctions she found "of more doctrinal gignificance than the majority acknowledges." I&aat 404 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 424-25 (Souter, 3., dissenting) (citing Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) anJ Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) and emphasizing
that monopoly was outlawed only by the Sherman Act, not by any constitutional provision); see also id.
at 416-17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Professors Regan, Smith and Tribe to similar effect).
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longstandingly a matter of local government concern, this argued in favor of
upholding the validity of the regulation.98 Additionally, because the primary
economic burdens of Clarkstown's flow control, in the form of higher disposal costs,
would fall on the very citizens who voted for the flow control measures," declaring
flow control invalid is not only not required under the Constitution, it is an intrusion
on fundamental democratic law making. As he emphasized in conclusion, "The
Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstown from
themselves."'"
Given the majority's clear rejection of both Justice Souter's and Justice O'Connor's
concerns, the C&A Carbone case legitimately should be viewed as a significant
dormant Commerce Clause decision. In labeling monopoly arrangements per se
discriminatory, the Court confirmed the trend begun in Fort Gratiot of finding
factual situations, even if not aimed at protecting local business interests,
increasingly subject to heightened scrutiny when local regulation prevents out-ofstate access to local private markets. In rejecting Justice O'Connor's virtual
representation arguments, the C&A Carbone Court confirmed Fort Gratiot's
message that virtual representation is inapplicable once a court finds
discrimination.'' By rejecting Justice O'Connor's concerns about expanding the
per se test, and rejecting her invitation to instead focus on a regulation's actual
overall effect on both local and interstate activity,"° the C&A Carbone majority
also confirmed the Fort Gratiot and Oregon Waste Courts' insistence that the
decision as to which Commerce Clause test should be applied must precede
discussion of the policy merits of particular factual situations, even though any
decision to apply the per se test will almost always be fatally determinative of the
merits."
Carbone's message is not positive for state or local regulators wishing to operate
with a freer hand. By emphasizing that local monopoly can itself become the evil
that requires heightened dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, the Court has
effectively accomplished through the dormant Commerce Clause what it believes
Congress has not permitted under the Sherman Act - to impose on states and
localities potential liability for restricting competition, although the local government

98. See id. at 417-21 (Souter, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 424-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 430 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. See supranotes 45-50 and accompanying text. Since "discrimination" is defined by the Oregon

Waste Court to mean merely "differential treatment," see supra note 64, 105, virtual representation
arguments would be unavailing in all differential treatment situations.
102. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402-03.
103. In the C&A Carbone case, having decided that monopoly flow control was subject to the per
se test, the majority then immediately placed that tests presumptions against Clarkstown's flow control,
thus dooming it to invalidity. See id. at 392-94. Under such Commerce Clause heightened scrutiny, it
is not enough for the municipality to show that the method of regulation chosen is the best to accomplish
a legitimate local purpose; the municipality must have "no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest" under the Court's current formulation and application of the test. Id. at 392; see also supra notes
38-42, 43, 53-64, 105 and accompanying text (discussing similar determinative applications in Fort
Gratiot and Oregon Waste).
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thought the restriction necessary to accomplish a legitimate local purpose."

Any

monopolies the state wishes to sponsor post-C&A Carbone may now have to be
justified as the only way to accomplish legitimate local health and safety goals,
rather than as preferred methods to obtain locally approved purposes. This would
be a potentially significant expansion of Commerce Clause restriction in favor of
free market goals."°

104. State action exemption from Sherman Act antitrust liability is granted to private persons whom
a political subdivision of the state has authorized to act anticompetitively. See generally Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980). However, under Dennis v. Higgins, 498
U.S. 439 (1991), claims may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the dormant
Commerce Clause. These claims can impose direct costs to the government in the form of attorneys fees,
even in situations where there is section 1983 immunity from individual liability. Such attorneys' fees
claims have been pursued in several waste cases. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Meyer,
63 F.3d 652, 662 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing lower court's dismissal of section 1983 claim); Medigen of
Ky., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 985 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's
award of attorneys fees); 1FI Medical Waste Sys. v. Whatcom County, 983 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1993)
(remanding for consideration of attorneys' fees claim).
For arguments that advocate the merging of antitrust and Commerce Clause standards around free
market values, see Randall S. Abate & Mark E. Bennett, ConstitutionalLimitations on Anticompetitive
State and Local Solid Waste Management Schemes: A New Frontierin Environmental Regulation, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 165 (1997); Gifford, supra note 7; cf Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the
Market ParticipantDoctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST. LJ.559 (1990) (criticizing immunity for state "proprietary"
functions as incompatible with existing market-participant immunity from dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny). Needless to say, I am opposed to increasing the pro-business aspects of the Commerce Clause
doctrine, and believe instead that the purpose of the clause is to protect against state overreaching rather
than to protect economic business relationships per se.
105. In response to C&A Carbone, the Third Circuit emphasized that all monopolies are subject to
inquiry under the dormant Commerce Clause and that only the most compelling case can be made for
upholding economic discrimination in favor of a local monopoly. See Atlantic Coast Demolition &
Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic City, 48 F.3d 701, 713-15 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Atlantic Coast 1); see also infra notes 144, 150-54 and accompanying text for more discussion of the
Atlantic Coast litigation.
A potentially important counterweight to Carbone's message about monopolies, however, may be
present in the Court's very recent decision in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S.Ct. 811 (1997),
where a regulated monopolist was allowed differential tax treatment regarding natural gas sold in
competition with other natural gas suppliers. Only Justice Stevens insisted that the focus for
discrimination purposes sl-ould be upon the product both the monopolist and the non-monopolist sold.
In Justice Stevens' view, all natural gas suppliers should get the same tax treatment for their sales of
dissenting) (comparing to thermostats or gas furnaces). For
natural gas. See id. at 831-32 (Stevens, J.,
the majority, however, if one of the possible justifications for the monopoly was that natural gas would
not otherwise be available for all customers, then the favored tgx treatment was also justified. See id.
at 826-27. Apparently tha Court is willing to define discrimination more leniently for authorized
monopolists than in other situations. Cf.Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 117 S.Ct.
dissenting) (suggesting that the Court in Tracy created a public utilities
1590, 1614 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
exception from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny). Perhaps we have yet another box into which the
current Court is inclined to deterministically sort dormant Commerce Clause situations. Legitimate
monopolies, under Tracy's logic, will receive fairly deferential Commerce Clause review. If the battle
is to become the legitimacy of the monopoly for dormant Commerce Clause purposes, however, then the
Court in future cases will need to provide more guidance about exactly what situations will and won't
qualify as being the "only" ways legitimate discriminatory purposes can be accomplished which justify
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Justice O'Connor is therefore right to emphasize that the distinctions between her
approach and the majority's are significant. Justice Souter is correct in his view that
the majority has, when "subsum[ing Clarkstown's] ordinance within the class of
in fact greatly
laws this Court has struck down as facially discriminatory ....
implied
Souter's
reach.""
Justice
dormant
Clause's
the
[Commerce]
extend[ed]
concerns about a return to substantive economic due process through the dormant
Commerce Clause" should also be taken as an early warning of the direction the
Court might yet take in the future if more attention is not paid to the implications
of its current dormant Commerce Clause decision-making methodology. Nevertheless, C&A Carbone does not yet re-enshrine any particular form of ecbnomic
relations or business interests as being constitutionally protected." The C&A
Carbone Court instead merely requires that no state can prohibit its citizens from
having at least theoretical access to the competitive business systems approved by
other states, except in situations where the state clearly justifies this cut-off as the
only way to accomplish legitimate local objectives.
C&A Carbone is consistent with and perhaps a logical outgrowth of the trend
identified in the earlier waste decisions. Taken together, the Court's five waste
decisions demonstrate increasingly rigid use of a per se test to strike down
regulations which are ambiguous as policy matters. State regulations which
differentially burden outsiders will be cut no slack, even if the burden imposed on
outsiders is slight. Under current tests, if a regulation cuts off outsiders from
potentially profitable in-state business, or if it cuts off insiders from potentially
profitable out-of-state business, the regulation constitutes per se discrimination
which the state will not be able to justify. This constitutes a significant shift from
the way Commerce Clause theory was operating only thirty years ago.
The extent of this shift can be demonstrated by comparing the approach in Pike
v. Bruce Church" to the reasoning the Court might use on the same type facts in
the post-Fort Gratiot,post-Oregon Waste, post-C&A Carbone world. In Pike, the
Court balanced the weakness of the state's regulatory purpose against the significant
harm to interstate commerce, and found the balance unconstitutional."' The Pike

the monopolist exemption from being counted discrimination per se. We know after C&A Carbone that
garbage management is not such an area, and we know after Tracy that natural gas service provided in
connection with a local end-of-pipe utility apparently is such an area. The criteria by which either
determination was made, however, are not spelled out in sufficient detail in either decision so as to
provide guidance for the next monopoly and dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
106. C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 411.
107. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
108. Justice Souter's citations to prior decisions and to commentary which have emphasized that fact
are not disputed by the majority. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
109. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
110. Pike involved an Arizona statute and regulation enacted pursuant to the statute that required
at
locally grown cantaloupes to be packed so as not to deceive consumers about their quality. See id.
138, 142-43. A California company which raised substantial quantities of cantaloupes in Arizona wished
to ship the cantaloupes to its packing facilities in California rather than pack them in Arizona. Arizona
prohibited such shipment outside the state on the grounds that it had a right to enforce its statute and
regulations, in order to enhance the reputation of fruit grown within the state. See id. at 144. The Pike
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facts, however, in C&A Carbone terms, represented a kind of indirect flow control,
in that a local grower was prohibited from sending cantaloupe to the place where
the grower thought the fruit could be safely". and most economically packaged.
Whereas the Pike Court talked about a stronger local purpose perhaps justifying
even outright discrimination,"' the current Court requires that there be no
alternatives before differential effect will be permitted."3 Although the Pike Court
mentioned virtual per se invalidity," 4 this discussion occurred only in the context
of a single balancing test that weighed harm against legitimacy."5 The current
Court instead seeks, without measuring strength of harms and legitimacies, to find
out which of its two very different tests should be applied, and increasingly finds
that the per se test is the appropriate test to apply to ambiguous facts. A requirement, as in Pike, that processing occur only in-state, would likely be struck

under current Court tests as discriminatory. There is some irony in the realization
that the very case which gives its name to the balancing test purportedly applicable
to evenhanded regulation situations might be evaluated under current Court
precedents as a discrimination case requiring use of per se scrutiny.""

As the garbage decisions demonstrate, the Court has shifted significantly since
Pike. In response to these shifts, several lower courts have reacted in oppositely
erroneous ways. On the one hand, some courts mistakenly have assumed that they
can rely on Pike-eraapproaches and precedents, despite the Court having modified
the ground rules in more recent decisions. On the other hand, some courts have
seen in the current trends a green light to refashion Commerce Clause constraints

Court held that such a weak purpose could not outweigh the significant harm of forcing the California
company to expend $200,000 to build packing facilities within Arizona. See id. at 146.
I1l. In Pike, there was no argument that the shipment of cantaloupes to California for packing
would involve any increased risk of health and safety harm to the general public. See id. at 143. In C&A
Carbone, however, as in Fort Gratiot, the state did contend that its regulation was motivated by
legitimate health and safety concerns. See, e.g., C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392-93; see aLo id. at 420dissenting). Whereas the Pike Court seemed to imply that the presence of
21, 428-29 (Souter, J.,
legitimate health and safety concerns might be capable of tipping the Commerce Clause balance
differently, the Carbone Court emphasized that, once differential effect had triggered its per se test, even
the most compelling health and safety concerns could not outweigh real Commerce Clause harm, so long
as there were any other ways, regardless of their increased expense, of addressing the health and safety
problems. Compare, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. at 143 with C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392-93.
112. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
113. See supra notes 44, 64, 105 and accompanying text.
114. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145.
115. See id.at 142-46.
116. I am aware that the Court in more recent years has often included the Pike case in its citation
of clearly discriminatory situations. See, e.g., GMC v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824 n.12; C&A Carbone,
511 U.S. at 391. The point in text, however, is that the current Court essentially pays lip service to the
truth that there is inherent ambiguity in many situations which could fairly be classified either as
discriminatory or evenhanded (or even more realistically as some combination of both). The Court says
that there is "no clear lina between these two strands of analysis." GMC, 117 S.Ct. at 824 n.12; see alto
C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Of course, there is no clear line separating
these categories."). Nevertheless, the Court demands that all situations must first be classified one way
or the other so that one of two very different tests can then be applied. This was not the approach of
Pike.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/7

1997]

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

in directions the Court has not approved, namely toward ushering in an age of
economic vested rights. It is to both of these misinterpreiations of recent Court
precedent which we now turn.
III. Flowing Against the Stream: The Second and Third Circuits Unconvincingly
Attempt to Recast the Court's Commerce Clause Messages
When the Court issues a clear but unpalatable message, governments and lower
courts either can follow the Court's directives or attempt to recast the Court's
message into something less objectionable. The danger of the latter course is that
when the Court eventually reverses the recastings, it may do so with a vengeance
and itself recast "objectionable" doctrine in a yet more determinative way, thus
leaving even less wiggle room for the next time around. In the 1980s, for example,
some waste planners pretended that Philadelphia'sexplicit prohibitions did not apply
to waste which was clearly hazardous, even though Justice Rehnquist's Philadelphia
dissent had emphasized the real harms of out-of-state waste, and even though one
of New Jersey's main arguments to the Philadelphia Court had been to urge a
quarantine exception which would apply only to clearly harmful substances. The
Court responded in Chemical Waste Management with a decision that applied
heightened scrutiny more mechanically than previously."7 Similarly, when waste
planners argued to the Court in Fort Gratiotthat the more serious waste planning
being undertaken by states in the modern era justified treating Philadelphiaas an
outdated precedent not on point, the Court not only did not embrace this suggestion,
but applied an expanded per se discrimination test to facts which were arguably
more neutral."'
Because recent Second and Third Circuit opinions upholding flow control are
clearly contrary to the Court's reasoning in C&A Carbone,any efforts to expand on
or use their logic are not just doomed to eventual failure on the merits. They may
also lead to the worse result of pushing the Court, in reaction, toward a version of
substantive economic due process, recycled through the dormant Commerce Clause,
that would prohibit what should be counted as constitutionally legitimate methods
for addressing out-of-state burdens. Accordingly, although I support the environmental policy behind these recent pro-flow control decisions, they are so clearly
contrary to what the Court recently has said that they must be severely criticized.
The Second Circuit simply tried to ignore the C&A Carbone message and weave
spurious market participant logic out of factual flow control differences which have
no constitutional significance. The Third Circuit tried to limit C&A Carboneto its
facts. Both circuits' approaches are untrue to the C&A Carbonedecision and to the
implications of other recent Court pronouncements.
More is at stake here than environmental policy. In claiming that C&A Carbone
did not apply to their facts, the Second Circuit, especially, not only misread the
breadth of the C&A Carbone holding and rationale, but also misconstrued market

117. See supra notes 31-32, 33 and accompanying text.

118. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
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participant arguments for exemption. This is not the first time market participant

logic has played a controversial role in trash decisions. In a 1989 Third Circuit
decision, the lower court majority correctly held that free market forces should not
alone be allowed to determine what is in the state's regulatory interests." 9 This time
around, however, the lower courts are erroneously claiming for the market

participant doctrine more exemption than it logically can and should provide. The
danger is that when the Court inevitably returns to the issue of what market
participation logic should look like, there will be no voice upholding a legitimate
version of the doctrine. Instead, there may be only detractors claiming that the

exemption should not exist at all versus proponents claiming for it an ability to
backdoor clearly unconstitutional forms of state regulation. In such a situation there
is always the risk that the Court will not discern or craft arguments differently from
those the parties put before it. Properly construed, market participation serves a

crucial function in larger dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Because this is
so, the doctrine should be properly explicated rather than either perverted or
discarded.
A. Dust and Din About Flow Control Being Constitutional
In USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,' and SSC Corp. v. Town of
Smithtown,' the Second Circuit paid lip service to C&A Carbone, but upheld,

under flawed market participant reasoning, the same kind of New York flow control
whose implementation the C&A Carbone Court had declared unconstitutional. In
Babylon, waste haulers who had been denied the opportunity to compete in the local

119. See Swin Resorce Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming Co., 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989) (majority ruling
that county-owned landfill did not violate dormant Commerce Clause by charging higher fees to out-ofarea residents). Perhaps because there was a vigorous dissent in this case by Chief Judge Gibbons,
attacking market participation doctrine generally, the Swin case has served as an important discussion
point for several commentators about the propriety of the market participation doctrine, especially in the
waste context. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant
Exception to the Dormait Commerce Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 727; C.M.A. McCauliff, The
Environment Held In Trustfor Future Generationsor the Dormant Commerce Clause Held Hostage to
the Invisible Hand of the Market?, 40 VILL. L. Rev. 645,667-82 (1995); Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does
Garbage Have Standing? Democracy, Flow Control and a Principled Constitutional Approach to
MunicipalSolid Waste Management, 11 PAcE ENvTL. L. REv. 157,228-43 (1993); Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-PartIcipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 395
(1989); David L. Johnson, Recent Developments, 49 VAND. L. REv. 753 (1996); Barton B. Clark,
Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States, Subdivisions and the Market ParticipantException to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U. CHi. L. REv. 615 (1993).
Prior to the Swin decision, the decision in LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I.
1987), upholding a ban on out-of-state trash to a state-owned landfill, even where that landfill was the
only facility in the state, also served as a significant precedent for animated disagreement about the
propriety of market participant exemption. CompareDavid Pomper, Note, Recycling Philadelphia v. New
Jersey: The DormantCommerce Clause, Postindustrial"Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309 (1989) (approving of the case and upholding the doctrine) with Kovacs &
Anderson, supra note 7 (criticizing the case and market participant exemption).
120. 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995).
121. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
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market for commercial trash customers challenged the local township's insistence
on monopoly trash collection. The monopoly contract also included a flow control
requirement imposed on the winning bidder. The Smithtown case involved claims
by a winning bidder in another township that he did not have to comply with flow
control requirements in the monopoly haulage contract he had won. In both cases,
decided by the same panel on the same day, the Second Circuit mistakenly asserted
that the townships' monopoly flow control schemes were justified under market

participant logic.
The Second Circuit's argument can be simply stated, and its fallacy quickly
revealed. On the one hand, the court acknowledged that any legislation which
directly requires all citizens of a town to dispose at or transport their trash to a
specific local facility is prohibited flow control legislation. Accordingly, the
Smithtown court declared unconstitutional the flow control regulations which the

City of Smithtown had not had the good sense to repeal post-C&A Carbone." On
the other hand, the Second Circuit held that it did not violate the Constitution for

a local township to require that only one company be given the license to collect
trash in the area, with this one company also required to take all the trash it collects
to a single local facility designated, and even partially owned, by the township.
Labeling such monopoly haulage contracts, with flow control strings attached,
"market participation," the Second Circuit authorized Babylon and Smithtown
indirectly to accomplish a form of flow control which they could not directly
legislate under C&A Carbone.

122. See Smithtown, 66 F.3d at 506, 512-14. Smithtown argued that its economic investment in the
facility to which it directed all waste made the town a market participant rather than a market regulator.
This argument was of course foreclosed by C&A Carbone. In the C&A Carbonecase, although the Tdwn
of Clarkstown did not own the facility to which it directed all trash be taken, ownership of that facility
would revert to Clarkstown for $1 after five years. Additionally, Clarkstown had entered into a put or
pay agreement with the operator of the Clarkstown transfer facility by which the Township was obligated
to pay for any trash below a certain amount not delivered and for which higher than market tipping fees
accordingly had not been received by the transfer facility. See supra notes 79, 82-79, 82 and
accompanying text. Thus it was not at all clear in the C&A Carbone case that the town of Clarkstown
could not have made the same arguments of "participation" as Smithtown.
The more fundamental flaw in Smithtown's economic investment argument, besides this lack of
difference from C&A Carbone's facts, however, is that it does not matter who owns the facility, when
the issue is whether people may be forced to take their trash to that facility. Forcing someone to do
something is market regulation, not market participation. If anything, the economic investment of
Smithtown in its flow control legislation exacerbates the Commerce Clause unconstitutionality under
C&A Carbone's logic. Essentially, Smithtown is arguing, "Since we've put a lot of money into this
facility, we must be allowed to force people to use it so that we can make sure we don't lose our shirts."
The C&A Carbone court labeled this an impermissible central purpose that a nonprotectionist regulation
would not serve. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393-94; see also supra notes 86-90 and accompanying
text.
In the Babylon case, the township's flow control ordinance was not an issue, since the township had
chosen not to enforce it post-C&A Carbone.See Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1278. As will become clear in text,
the replacement of Babylon's flow control ordinance with monopoly contract requirements merely
attempted indirectly what was directly prohibited under C&A Carbone. See infra notes 124-38 and
accompanying text.
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The large error in the Second Circuit's logic was its failure to acknowledge that
the creation of a private local monopoly was itself the primary "evil" which the
C&A Carbonemajority had identified as unconstitutional. Justice Souter had argued
in dissent in C&A Carbone that no particular form of economic relations were
required under the Commerce Clause, and that a community which to its own
detriment chooses to authorize monopoly in order to address legitimate health and
safety concerns should not thereby be found to violate the Commerce Clause. The
C&A Carbonemajority rejected these arguments, however, and insisted that the evil
of flow control was that it "squelches competition in the waste-processing service
altogether."'" It was not the particular method by which flow control came into
existence that irked the C&A Carbone Court, but rather that town-wide mandatory
flow control completely displaced the competition which those associated with other
states are allowed to seek under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Second Circuit simply refused to acknowledge that the Court meant to go so
far in C&A Carbone. Acknowledging that creation of a local monopoly is market
regulation rather than market participation," the Second Circuit never successfully
defended against C&A Carbone'slogic that such absolute elimination of competition
requires that monopolies be subjected to the per se test. Thus, despite the fact that
two important Supreme Court precedents approving monopoly flow control outside
of the dormant Commerce Clause context"9 had been argued to the C&A Carbone
Court and ignored as irrelevant by the C&A Carbone majority, the Second
Circuit continued to rely on these cases for the principle that the Supreme Court
could not possibly intend to rule municipal monopoly of trash collection unconstitutional." Similarly, discussion in the Second Circuit cases about the free
128
and open bidding process by which a favored hauler was awarded a monopoly
was completely wid-, of the mark." Under C&A Carbone's logic, there is no
constitutional distinction between accomplishing monopoly flow control by having
all haulers dispose at the monopoly transfer station, versus achieving monopoly flow
control by permitting only one monopoly hauler to take trash where the town
dictates.
By emphasizing a township's rights, as market participant, to impose conditions
on those with whom it does business, the Second Circuit lost sight of the fact that
this was the less important part of the township's plan. Under a monopoly haulage
regime, no one else is allowed to pick up trash. Presumably the bidder for such a
monopoly franchise is willing either to give a volume discount or to pay the town

123. C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392.
124. See, e.g., Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1282-83.
125. See supra note 77 (briefly describing California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works,
199 U.S. 306 (1905) and Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905)).
126. See, e.g., Respondent's Brief at 13, 41-44 C&A Carbone (No. 92-1402).
127. See Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1276, 1292-94.
128. See Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1277, 1278-79, 1287, 1290; SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66
F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. IS95).
129. This point became an even larger mistaken emphasis in the Third Circuit's mis-analysis, which
shall receive more detailed attention shortly. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
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a bonus for being able to charge for disposal of all of the town's trash. This
monopoly discount or bonus only makes economic sense if no citizen within the
township's boundaries can take her trash anywhere except to the approved hauler.
When granting exclusive contract to the monopolist hauler, the town presumably is
ready to penalize anyone who does not use that hauler's services, or at least who
refuses to pay for that hauler's services. 3 ' This means that the flow control will
be just as complete, or perhaps even more effective, than under a regime which
mandates only ultimate destination.'
In the Babylon case, the recycling of flow control from one methodology to
another was particularly transparent. Pre-C&A Carbone, Babylon achieved flow
control by ordering all haulers to the designated local facility. Post-C&A Carbone,
Babylon simply eliminated all competition and then ordered the winning bidder to
dispose of its waste at the same pre-C&A Carbonedesignated facility. If anything,
Babylon's post-C&A Carbone version of flow control was more disruptive of
economic markets than the pre-version. At least haulers in Babylon's pre-C&A
Carbone world could all try for as much of a piece of the local commercial waste
processing market as they each could capture. In Babylon's post-C&A Carbone
version of flow control, only one favored hauler is allowed access to the market,
and the flow control thereby is effectively doubled, i.e., both at the pickup point and
at the point of ultimate disposal.' Decreasing the amount of local competition
does not increase Commerce Clause constitutionality.
The Babylon flow control was additionally not market participation as defined in
the post-C&A Carbone, post-West Lynn Creamery world, because it funded the
favored facility via targeted, pass-through assessments rather than with government
general revenues. To finance the monopoly commercial trash pickup, the town
assessed a $1500 annual benefit against improved properties in the District which
would need commercial disposal service. The town then also assessed "user fees"
against any such business parcels which would generate more than the amount of
trash deemed to be covered by the $1500 fee.' All of these collected funds were
dedicated to the garbage service contract, or in other words, passed through to the
favored hauler, as the town's agent for commercial garbage collection.
The basic constitutional problem with such an arrangement is that it forces a
minority of citizens to bear the expenses for services a majority deems necessary,

130. See, e.g., Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1280, 1282.
131. When town residents can dispose of their trash only by putting it at the curb for pickup by one
approved hauler, there is increased certainty that the trash will ultimately go where the town designates,
since the only monitoring of trash required is to make sure it goes into the single approved company's
receptacles. Should the monopoly hauler choose to take trash somewhere other than the approved facility,
this would be at additional cost in a well-structured flow control arrangement, where tipping fees to the
approved facility would be set appropriately low, at least for the approved hauler, based on the volume
of trash to be collected by that hauler. The hauler may even be given free tipping at a designated townowned facility, and be allowed to pass through the costs of his bid (which would finance the disposal
facility) plus acceptable profit to the "customers" who are required to use his services. Cf. id. at 1279
(describing Babylon's financial arrangements with its monopoly handler).
132. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
133. See Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1279.
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without allowing the payer to seek satisfactory service from out-of-state contractors
at a better price. At first glance, it might seem a full response to unfairness claims
to emphasize that the fees collected must be reasonably related to the services
provided, since the fees go entirely for the service provided."3 But this hardly
addresses a Commerce Clause claim of constitutional right of access to out-of-state
servicers of the same quality who charge less. Nor is it accurate to compare a
service required of only a minority, to a government monopoly desired to be used

by the entire population.3
What happens in situations where those "given" the monopoly service have not

asked for it is that there is no incentive, except for reaction to the complaining
voices of this assessed minority, to keep prices down, since the majority of those

who vote for the monopoly do not feel its sting." Additionally, since the total
amounts of funds to finance the project come only from those who are assessed the

monopolist's fees, there is absolutely no financial cost to the majority for such a
self-financing project. As the Court recently has emphasized, the lack of normal

political checks on government using its own funds for legitimate governmental
purposes can serve as evidence of possible Commerce Clause harm.'37 In market
participant terminology, the problem is that the funds never became the

134. See id. at 1286 n.12.
135. See id. at 1286 n.13. Even a monopoly for the "benefit" of the entire town also is
unconstitutional under C&A Carbone, since the town generators are deprived of access to interstate
competition which allegedly could do the job as safely but more cheaply. Under C&A Carbone logic,
such denial of access constitutes facial discrimination. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
A monopoly as in Babylon, however, which forces only partof the town to pay higher prices for "necessary" services even more directly risks that the majority of government will not oppose something which
does not harm them. Whether one agrees with the logic of C&A Carbone or not, Babylon constitutes a
much weaker case in favor of upholding the monopoly service provided, since it imposes alleged
monopoly inefficiency upon only part of the citizenship. This is not the Town of Babylon imposing an
arrangement upon itself to its own detriment (but also for its own benefit). Cf. C&A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 429-30 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). This instead is the town
imposing an arrangement upon part of the town for the alleged benefit of the rest of the town, and also
for the direct pecuniary benefit of the monopolist server of the minority.
136. Cf. Gifford, supra note 7 (making similar arguments in the context of a larger critique of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). While I disagree with Professor Gifford's larger argument that
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine should be reshaped to look more like antitrust rules or made to
uphold absolutely free markets as a constitutional value, his economic points make more sense as a
counter to absolute exemption from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny in situations where the state is
claiming market participant exemption but is using that label to rearrange the economics of services for
which those who pay did not vote.
137. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1994). In West Lynn Creamery,
dairy farmers were given a subsidy from fees assessed against all milk processed or sold in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts dairy farmers, without the subsidy, might have opposed a fee placed on
milk processing or sale in Massachusetts, since this cost might potentially be passed back to them via
lower sales price for milk in order to tighten profit margins. However, on the West Lynn facts, because
the fees raised went to them, they supported, and indeed sponsored, the measure. The normal political
check of insiders' interests effectively representing outsiders' interests had been skewed by an economic
arrangement which, for insiders, took money out of one pocket but then put even more money back into
another pocket; whereas for outsiders the economic harm was still fully felt when the money was first
collected.
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government's own to use as it sees fit. This is so since the funds went directly from
the regulated entity to the monopolist, rather than first to the government for
consideration of what purposes, among several competing agendas, the government
might find are in the best interests of the whole populace. Thus, the issue in
Babylon was not the legitimacy of general taxes assessed against all businesses,
which was the way the Babylon court framed the issue.' Rather, the issue was
the illegitimacy of an assessment placed only against businesses, where those funds
then never came at all under the government's direct majoritarian control.
In its claims that towns can act as market participants by eliminating competition,
the Second Circuit may have been deliberately attempting to manipulate factual
C&A Carbone differences which have no constitutional significance. Alternatively,
the court fell into the trap of overreading the truth that a township may attach
conditions to contracts it has the power to make, as standing for a quite different
and fallacious set of propositions. Just because a township can attach conditions to
its contracts, this does not imply that the township thereby has authority to keep
others, with whom it does not contract, away from potential customers who are
citizens of the township. To say this another way, the township's legitimate
authority to attach conditions to any deals it enters into does not mean that the
township can give over to a bid winner "customers" who did not choose the bid
winner and who have no opt-out provisions. The Smithtown case offers a somewhat
sympathetic factual scenario for part of this misreading, but even in that case there
is no real excuse for the Second Circuit not to have been more careful in its
analysis.
In Smithtown, the appellant was not a competitor cut off from access to the local
market, but rather the monopoly bid winner. As I elsewhere have argued, it is
particularly ungenerous and constitutionally inconsistent for a bid winner both to
insist that it is entitled to exclude all other competitors from "its" market and at the
same time complain about restrictive conditions that accompany the unconstitutional
monopoly it desires.'39 The truly valid Commerce Clause objections to a double
flow control arrangement are against local monopoly itself, rather than against the
additional flow control directives given the monopoly winner. As explained above,
the flow control attempted through a monopoly haulage contract is two-phase flow
control. The residents are first flow controlled to the monopoly hauler; the hauler
is then flow controlled to the designated facility. Absent the unconstitutional first
phase requirement that all residents must use the winning hauler's services, there
would be no flow control for the township as a whole. Absent the first phase
monopoly, any competitors allowed access to the same customer base, but not
subject to any contract directives, could take trash wherever they wish. As against
the hauler who desires the benefits of such an exclusive government contract,
Smithtown could rightly insist that this hauler should not be allowed to keep all the

138. See Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1286.
139. See Cox, What May States Do?,supranote 21, at 617-18 (labeling such behavior a "have-your-

cake-and-eat-it-too" attitude).
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customers he bid for but then also get a far higher profit margin than was part of
the total package bid."4
The Smithtown court was only partially correct, however, that there can be no
constitutional objection to the government attempting to benefit its own or
accomplishing "selfish" purposes through a contract the township did not have to
offer to the private sector. Local governments may prefer local building contractors,
hire primarily local workers, and limit access to only local residents for any
products they produce with their own money. The Smithtown court correctly relied
upon cases such as White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc.'41 for the proposition that a township which itself could provide city-owned
trash trucks for curbside pickup and direct that trash wherever it wants does not lose
the2 ability to direct this flow when it hires someone else to do curbside pickup for
it.1

4

Where the Second Circuit went wrong was in assuming that a township may
prohibit others from trying to obtain curbside customers. To compare to a
traditional governmental service like public education, it is certainly true that a local
school board may prefer local building contractors, hire primarily local teachers, and
limit access to its classrooms to only local residents. But local school boards may
not insist that all local residents must attend the local school. If a local taxpayer
wishes to pull her children out and pay the extra money to send her children to
private institutions, &e local school board may not insist that monopoly is required
to keep enough bodies in the public school to justify payments made to those hired
to run it. Similar possibility of competition is required regarding trash services
under the C&A Carbone Court's reading of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Whereas the Second Circuit overread market participation possibilities as
justifying a local government explicitly to prohibit competition against itself, the
Third Circuit, in Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester,143 attempted to
distinguish and thereby limit the effect of both C&A Carbone and of a prior
application of Carbcne." Focusing on the fairness of the bidding process that

140. Cf. Smith v. Borough of East Stroudsburg, 694 A.2d 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (setting aside
bid won by competitor who priced his bid on assumption of being able to violate the local ordinance
requiring flow control, whin other bidders had priced on basis of having to comply with the flow control
provisions).
141. 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (holding that city would be allowed as market participant to place condition in city construction contracts requiring that a certain percentage of employees be local).
142. See SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Babylon,
66 F.3d at 1289.
143. 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
144. The prior application was in Atlantic CoastDemolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen
Freeholdersof Atlantic City, 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995) (Atlantic Coast 1). The Atlantic Coast I court
held that regulations requiring that all nonrecyclable waste be processed ip a designated transfer facility
triggers C&A Carbone requirements, even if the facility is owned by the waste district and constitutes
part of a serious statewide approach to health and safety problems. See id. at 718. The case was
remanded to district court for further fact-finding under the per se test. On remand, the district court held
the provisions of New Jersey's flow control scheme clearly unconstitutional but stayed the injunction
issued in connection with its final judgment for two years to give the state of New Jersey time to develop
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produced a monopoly winner, and on the practical effects of monopoly flow control
on the interstate waste market, a two judge majority for the Third Circuit mistakenly
asserted that C&A Carbone could be read to allow Pike balancing whenever flow
control did not seem truly designed to accomplish local economic protectionist
purposes. While the Third Circuit's arguments make environmental and even
dormant Commerce Clause policy sense, they are foreclosed by C&A Carbone and
by prior Court waste precedents.
The Third Circuit majority argued that C&A Carbone's restrictions apply only to
local monopolies established for an economic protectionist purpose. After defining
economic protectionism as a benefit to insiders at the expense of outsiders, the
majority then reasoned that it would be absurd to insist that the only way a
community can avoid violations of the dormant Commerce Clause is to designate
an out-of-state facility to be sole recipient of locally generated trash. 45 Accordingly, the Third Circuit thought not every situation where a local community
designates a local entity to receive its trash would violate the Commerce Clause.
If the community could demonstrate that its designation process was open to
significant out-of-state bidders, and that its proposed contract terms did not
realistically discourage open competition for the monopoly designation, the Third
Circuit thought the designation might be constitutionally permissible."4 Additionally, if the designation would not prohibit future competition with the monopoly
winner by lasting for an unreasonably long time, the Third Circuit majority would
take this into account as evidence of nondiscriminatory purpose.47 The Harvey &
Harvey panel therefore remanded to the trial courts4 ' for further fact-finding
regarding exactly how each challenged township's plan worked.
The Third Circuit improperly attempted to distinguish situations where a local
community uses flow control to favor or finance local operations from situations
where the main purpose of the flow control is to ensure safe and stable disposal
capacity. The attempt was to shift the emphasis in dormant Commerce Clause waste
decisions to the reality of a locality's motivations rather than to presume unconstitutionality because local citizens had been denied access to a competitive
market. While there is some room in both C&A Carbone and in the prior Third
Circuit Atlantic Coast decision for such attempted distinction based on local
favoritism, this factual emphasis is unfortunately not true to the spirit of either of

a nondiscriminatory plan for waste management. See Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling v. Board
of Chosen Freeholders, 931 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1996), affd with modification, 112 F.3d 652 (3d Cir.
1997) (Atlantic Coast11); see also Waste Mgmt. of Pa., Inc. v. Shinn, 938 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.J. 1996)
(declaring unconstitutional any aspects of New Jersey's waste self-sufficiency policy which would favor
in-state long-term contracts over contracts for out-of-state disposal); infra notes 153, 159 (describing
additional aspects of the Atlantic Coast 11 decisions).
145. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 803-04 (3d Cir. 1995).
146. See id. at 801-02, 805-08.
147. See id. at 799-800, 801, 806, 809.
148. The Harvey & Harvey opinion responded to two appeals involving two separate townships'
flow control regimes which raised similar issues about whether Pennsylvania-authorized flow control
could be found constitutional. The appeals had been briefed separately but were consolidated for oral

argument. See id. at 791.
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those prior decisions. 49 The attempted reshifting ignores the protectionism the
C&A Carbone Court linked to flow control per se.
In Atlantic Coast I, the Third Circuit previously had addressed the
constitutionality of New Jersey flow control arrangements at a time when the C&A
Carbone decision was hot off the press. Although the Atlantic Coast I court did
note that the facts of New Jersey's required flow control favored local operators at
the expense of out-of-state facilities desiring the same business,'" that was not the
primary thrust of the decision. Instead, the Atlantic Coast I court focused on the

evils of monopoly per se, noting that this also had been the thrust of the C&A
Carbone decision.'' In response to New Jersey's arguments that because the
public interest was being both burdened and served by such utility's existence, a
regulated public utility would be subject at most to Pike scrutiny, the Atlantic Coast
I court emphasized that state utility regulation was to be judged by the same
Commerce Clause tests as all other forms of state regulation.' What this meant
was that because monopoly flow control by its very nature deprives local generators
of access to the best price on the interstate market, it constituted discrimination per

se. Only the most compelling state purpose, not achievable under any alternative
means, would support monopoly flow control under the heightened scrutiny thus
required to be applied.
This Atlantic Coast I reasoning was more true to the spirit of C&A Carbonethan
the later Harvey & Harvey majority's reasoning."' It might be a legitimate local

149. See also supra notes 75-108 and accompanying text (discussing C&A Carbone).
150. See Atlantic Coaist Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic
City, 48 F.3d 701, 707-08, 715 (3d Cir. 1995) (Atlantic Coast 1).
151. See id. at 711-12.
152. See id. at 713-15. New Jersey also argued that its flow control regulation was exempt from
dormant Commerce Clausa scrutiny under market participant logic, making erroneous arguments similar
to those brought before the Second Circuit in Babylon and Smithtown. The Atlantic Coast I court
correctly rejected these claims, emphasizing that the districts' flow control requirements "purport to
control the market activities of private market participants" by "requirling] everyone involved in waste
collection and transportation to bring all waste ... to the designated facilities ... (and] to purchase the
government service - even when a better price can be obtained on the open market. New Jersey's waste
flow control regulations were thus promulgated by it in its role as a market regulator, not in its capacity
as a market participant." Id. at 717.
153. In Atlantic Coast Demolition v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 112 F.3d 652 (3d Cir. 1997)
(Atlantic Coast 11), the Third Circuit reaffirmed the holding and most of the analysis of Atlantic Coast
L The Atlantic Coast I court specifically noted that no Harvey & Harvey claims of exemption can apply
where the designation proess requires waste to go only to in-state facilities. See id. at 662-63 (describing
how New Jersey flow control only to New Jersey facilities is therefore clearly unconstitutional and
distinguishing Harvey & Harvey on that ground). Applying the near-fatal heightened scrutiny required
to be applied in such diccrimination situations, see, e.g., id. at 664 n.16, the Atlantic Coast II court
required New Jersey to stop denying access to out-of-state waste services for New Jersey generated
waste, regardless of how much hardship this might cause local government. The court affirmed the trial
judge's findings of unconstitutionality, but then also severely shortened a more liberal time frame the trial
judge had set up before the injunction against enforcement of New Jersey's unconstitutional flow control
would become effective. See id. at 660-61, 671-73.
It is interesting to note that the Harvey & Harvey decision was a 2-1 decision. The vigorous dissent
in that case would have allowed no fair competition exceptions but simply would have struck the
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purpose to lock up disposal capacity, and thereby assure that all locally generated
waste will be properly discarded. Such control over the waste stream for health and
safety reasons might best be achieved through a flow control arrangement which
would guarantee volume to a single transporter or site. But the point of C&A
Carbone is that all such arrangements deprive local generators of access to
potentially lower priced services offered in the interstate market and therefore are
per se discriminatory. They can only be justified if there are no alternatives to the
proposed monopoly that might accomplish the same health and safety goals with
less intrusion on interstate commerce." Similar messages about legitimacy of
local purpose not being able to overcome differential treatment had been delivered
55
in Fort Gratiot.'
The Third Circuit's attempt in Harvey & Harvey to recast the C&A Carbone
decision as addressing only the second stage flow control designation completely
ignores C&A Carbone's more fundamental emphasis that impermissible
discrimination is deemed to occur at the first stage of flow control, when local
generators are deprived of access to the competitive services of the interstate waste
market. In C&A Carbone, as in Harvey & Harvey, the municipality was assumed
to have sought competitive bids before it awarded its contract for a designated
transfer facility. The precise argument that fair competition for a monopoly
supposedly proves that there is no harm to the interstate waste market had also been
heard and rejected by the C&A Carbone majority." In sum, it is immaterial how
fair the bidding process is, or who gets the final economic benefit of monopoly. If
monopoly itself is per se discriminatory, Pike analysis is simply inappropriate under
the Court's current precedents.
Why do some courts and waste planners continue to misread what the Court has
said?" The most likely answer is that, trying to do a good job of addressing in

monopoly schemes involved as clearly discriminatory under C&A Carbone. See Harvey & Harvey, 68
F.3d at 809-11 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). This was also the approach taken by the trial judge in the TriCounty part of the Harvey & Harvey consolidated appeal. See id. at 807. The Atlantic Coast decisions,
on the other hand, were unanimous. Although current Third Circuit panels and lower court judges in that
circuit must try to reconcile the tension inherent between the approaches taken in Atlantic CoastI and
in Harvey & Harvey, no similar need to mask over inconsistencies should be elsewhere encouraged or
engaged in. The approach of the Atlantic Coast I panel is more in line with what the Supreme Court
ruled in C&A Carbone than any exceptions the Third Circuit, by a divided panel, subsequently
introduced into that circuit's dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
154. Cf. id. at 715 ("Where the regulation is addressed to a utility, like a local gas utility and unlike
Atlantic Coast, whose service requires a tangible distribution system, a franchise monopoly may be the
only economically feasible alternative .... " (emphasis added)). In the waste context, it cannot credibly
be argued that the only way to collect trash is to have one company own all the trucks that pick up at
curbside. Whatever distribution system is involved may be of the trash haulers' makings, so long as all
trash ends up being safely disposed. The Atlantic Coast I court's comments accurately distinguish the
Court's subsequent decision in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997) (allowing
differential tax treatment for regulated monopolist utilities which provide bundled natural gas to
consumers via direct pipes to their homes).
155. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
156. See Respondent's Brief at 45, C&A Carbone (No. 92-1402).
157. A different sort of misreading has been conducted in the Eighth Circuit recently in Ben
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practical terms the real problems associated with waste disposal, those closest to the
ground become convinced that the Court cannot possibly have meant its sweeping
prohibition against the form of regulation they want to apply. Flow control in
particular makes excellent waste planning sense,158 and usually is not primarily
motivated by economic rationales. Nevertheless, C&A Carbone declared it
unconstitutional across the board. It is wishful thinking to believe that factual
differences can undo the logic of a decision that was not based on and did not
emphasize the facts before it. C&A Carbone's prohibition of fiated flow control
indeed makes it exceedingly difficult for waste planners to deal effectively with the
reality of their waste problems. But no amount of proof that flow control serves

Oehrleins & Sons & Daughters v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1997). In this case, the
Eighth Circuit held that waste generators do not have standing to challenge higher waste fees they are
charged as a result of flov control, at least where the haulers who charge them those fees are the main
plaintiffs in the action. See id. at 1379-82. With the important qualification of the last clause of the
previous sentence, the Ben Oehrleins opinion may do little damage to dormant Commerce Clause
standing rationale. On the facts of the Ben Oehrleins case, the plaintiff generators apparently shot
themselves in the foot by claiming that their only harms were derivative of the haulers with whom they
had contracted. See, e.g., id. at 1379 n.6.
In most Commerce Clause situations, however, the waste generator would claim that her Commerce
Clause harms are direct. Flow control deprives the generator of the ability to choose for herself, from
among competitors participating in an interstate market, who will take care of her waste needs, If the
generator desires to haul her own waste to a facility not on the flow control list, the flow control regime
clearly directly harms her. The Commerce Clause harm should be considered just as real, and the
attendant standing requirements therefore satisfied, if the generator wishes to hire someone else to haul
for her. The plaintiff in C&A Carbone was in fact a local waste generator and the C&A Carbone Court's
invalidation of flow control was for the benefit of all such local waste generators. The C&A Carbone
analysis focused as much on the deprivation to these generators of access to an interstate market as it
did on deprivation to any out-of-state waste haulers, who were not even parties in the C&A Carbonesuit.
And it was the deprivation of waste generator access to that interstate market which the C&A Carbone
Court labeled discrimination pre se, triggering heightened scrutiny. See supra notes 75-108.
The Eighth Circuit's analysis seems especially misguided, therefore, when the court seems to argue
that to be within the zone of interests designed to be protected by the dormant Commerce Clause, the
plaintiff must contract with or be an out-of-stater. See Ben Oehrleins, 115 F.3d at 1382. This idea that
the court can call no Corrmerce Clause foul for in-state harms is similarly echoed in the Ben Oehrleins
court's remand for Pie manalysis of the part of Hennepin County's regime which affected only waste
destined for disposal somewhere else in Minnesota. See id. at 1385-87. Under the Ben Oehrleins court's
reasoning, to claim Conurerce Clause protection, a plaintiff apparently has to try to ship waste physically
out-of-state. This is a strange result in situations where it is the competitive pricing of the interstate
market which makes in-state and out-of-state competitors essentially identical from the plaintiffs point
of view. Under the Ben Oehrleins court's apparent reasoning, however, if one plaintiff wished to ship
to a landfill barely within the Minnesota border, whereas another plaintiff wished to ship to another
landfill located just acros; the state line which charged the same, only the second plaintiff would have
Commerce Clause protecion. This result seems contrary to Court precedent, which consistently reads
the scope of dormant Commerce Clause protection to be at least as wide as what Congress directly would
be able to regulate. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 159697 (1997) and sources cited therein; cf Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (scope of congressional
power to regulate extends to purely local activity that affects national economic market for same goods
or services).
158. See supra notec 79, 82-100 and accompanying text; see also Petersen & Abramowitz, supra
note 75, at 365-69.
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very legitimate governmental purposes can bring it back under Pike scrutiny in the
post-C&A Carbone world.'59 Carbone instead requires governments to try all less
discriminatory methods of managing solid waste, despite how burdensome and
inefficient these are from the local waste planner's perspective."
B. The Need to Preserve Legitimate Market ParticipationExemption
The prime danger in pushing flow control out of keeping with Court precedent,
as the Second and Third Circuit have done, is that this may do damage to other
doctrines which the Court has not yet invalidated. The main such doctrines I have
in mind are the market participant exemption from dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny and the state action exemption from Sherman Act violations. There is no
shortage of critics of the market participant doctrine. These critics would relish the
opportunity to persuade the Court that the doctrine should be severely curtailed, if
not abolished altogether. 6' Similarly, there has been a renewed push by some

159. Only if waste managers in the future are able to prove that, without flow control, waste indeed
cannot be effectively managed, would there be any chance that flow control constitutionally could be
reinstated. Even in the face of some evidence to that effect, the Third Circuit still invalidated the flow
control before it. The district court, after remand from Atlantic Coast 1,was offered evidence that failure
to require flow control was in fact leading to more unaccounted-for trash presumably being improperly
disposed of. While the trial judge wrote that he was "befuddled" by this information, Atlantic Coast
Demolition & Recycling v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 909 F. Supp. 229, 237 (D.N.J. 1995), he
nevertheless issued, in November 1995, a preliminary injunction against any flow control of construction
and demolition waste. This injunction was made permanent in July 1996 and expanded to include other
aspects of New Jersey's flow control regime. Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders, 931 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1996). The Third Circuit, on appeal in Atlantic Coast II, as
previously noted, affirmed all trial court findings of unconstitutionality regarding New Jersey's flow
control regime, and shortened the time frame for imposition of the injunction as to waste not already
enjoined by the trial court's 1996 order. See supra note 153.
160. The fact that the C&A Carbone decision makes such bad policy sense is to my mind some
indication of its unsoundness.
161. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, The State ProprietaryException to the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A PersistentNineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73; Kovacs & Anderson, supra
note 7; Manheim, supra note 104; Michael J. Polelle, A Critique of the Market ParticipationException,
15 WHITTIER L. REv. 647 (1994); Barbara J. Redman, The Market Regulator-Market Participant
Distinctionand Supreme Court Vigilance over DiscriminatoryState Programs: Does Economic Theory
Justify the Judicial Effort?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 585 (1988); Paul R. Harper, Note, Solid Waste Transport:
Commerce Clause Restrictions and Free Market Incentives, 24 AKRON L. REv. 681 (1991); cf. Barton
B. Clark, supra note 119 (expressing concern over broad interpretations of the doctrine); Kenton R.
O'Neil, Comment, "Buy American" Statutes: Should the Market Participant Doctrine Shield Pennsylvania's Steel Products ProcurementAct from Commerce Clause Scrutiny?, 96 DICK. L. REV. 519
(1992) (expressing concerns that overly broad definitions of market in which state participates would
allow improper protectionist actions).
For other commentary which is not so hostile to the market participant doctrine, see, e.g., Thomas K.
Anson & P.M. Schenkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59
TEx. L. REv. 71 (1980); Benjamin C. Bair, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Mandated
Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a More Substantive Application of the
Market-ParticipantException, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2408 (1995); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and
the Market, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1097 (1988); Richard H. Seamon, Note, The Market ParticipantTest in
Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis - ProtectingProtectionism?, 1985 DuKE L.J. 697.
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academic critics and judges to reevaluate the state action exemption which states
currently enjoy from Sherman Act antitrust suits." By attempting to stretch the
market participant exemption doctrine beyond Court precedents, courts like the
Second and Third Circuits risk undermining state exemptions from constitutional
and statutory challenge which are appropriate in other factual contexts. I leave
elaboration of the Sherman Act arguments for another day, but comment here in
some detail on how properly constructed market participant arrangements are
consistent with the Court's most recent precedents.
The main criticism offered against market participant exemption is that when the
state acts in a market, it almost never acts like a regular participant, but instead
usually skews free market forces, thereby destroying competition. This point was
acknowledged by Justice Souter in his C&A Carbone dissent, when he noted that
"it is far from clear that the alternative to flow control (i.e., subsidies from general
tax revenues or municipal bonds) would be less disruptive of interstate commerce
than flow control, since a subsidized competitor can effectively squelch competition
by underbidding it."'" Opponents of market participation urge that the doctrine,
if it should ever be employed at all, should be allowed only in situations where the
state is acting purely as a participant, rather than with any extra clout (financially
subsidized or otherwise) associated with government.
Such criticisms misconstrue the justification for the market participant exemption.
The point of prior Court precedents is not simply that the state has a right to pick
and choose its customers like any other business.TM The larger point of the market
participation exemption is the state's ability to implement important social policies
which otherwise might not be undertaken. When Boston required more local
employment," when Virginia created a market in scrap hulks,'" whenever the
state acts as a market participant, there is likely to be significantinterference with
the private sector. The whole point of market participation is that the private sector
may not be able or willing to do a job the way government needs it done. Thus, in
the waste context, the necessity for Materials Recovery Facilities (MRF's), or for
composting facilities, may be something the state sees more of a need for than does

162. See, e.g., Abate & Bennett, supra note 104; Gifford, supra note 7; James F. Ponsoldt,
BalancingFederalismand Free Markets: Towards Renewed Antitrust Policing,Privatization,or a "State
Supervision"Screenfor Municipal Market ParticipantConduct, 48 SMU L. REV. 1783 (1995); cf.John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1986) (arguing
that Supreme Court's earlier broad deference to state sovereignty has been narrowed by restrictive
definitions of state action that often permit federal antitrust review of important state regulatory policies).
163. C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383, 429-30 (1994).
164. For language emphasizing the state's right to pick and choose customers, see, e.g., Reeves, Inc.

v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-39 (1980). My point in text is that the state's right so to pick and choose
its customers cannot logically be made contingent on the state giving up its right to regulate the market
in which it also chooses to participate. The choice is not market participant or market regulator. The
state always remains regulator, for to give up its duty to regulate health and safety issues would return
us to a laissez faire mentlity opposite to the model of potentially activist government at the heart of the
market participant doctrine.
165. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
166. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/7

1997]

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

the private sector. 67 The Commerce Clause quite properly does not tie
government's hands when it wishes to spend its funds to accomplish social, political,
or even economic goals.
This immunity from further Commerce Clause scrutiny is appropriate, because
the state's participation proves its unambiguous commitment, at its economic
detriment, to accomplishing its policies. In situations where the state merely
regulates to accomplish an arguably legitimate local purpose, there is not necessarily
any direct cost to the state's citizenry. The dormant Commerce Clause accordingly
steps in to make sure the state regulation is not primarily taxing outsiders for insider
benefit." But when general revenue public funds must be expended on a project,
the citizens are acting directly at their own cost. There is no need for additional
Commerce Clause scrutiny, not because there may not be economic harm to
outsiders, for there likely will be. The exemption from scrutiny is unnecessary,
because a state which spends its own money to promote interests that its citizens
deem important does not overreach its Commerce Clause authority vis-h-vis other
states or their citizens.
The main requirement for market participation exemption, then, is participation,
not that the government go no further than could a private entity in its operations
and goals. Thus, when the Court inquires as to whether the state is acting as
participant or regulator, the emphasis is on whether the state really has entered the
market, or only pretended to do so in an effort to mask its regulation of others. If
the state really has entered the market, its effects on that market are not to be
measured against any other values. Absolute exemption from further dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny is quite properly granted under the market participant
exemption.
However, the state's exemption extends only so far as it actually participates.
When the state makes and sells cement, it may sell that cement to whomever it
wants, for profit or loss, regardless of how this affects the profitability of other
cement manufacturers or users.6 But the state may not set prices or terms for
others involved in cement sales or manufacturing based on the fact that it is
involved in the cement market. Such regulation of others' involvement in the
cement market is subject to normal dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, regardless
of how many cement plants the state owns." 0

167. See, e.g., Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 75.
168. A special interest group wishing regulatory favors that could be couched in terms of public
good, but which are really aimed at gaining competitive advantage over outsiders, might easily persuade
a state or local legislature to pass a measure in its favor. Taking care of one segment of the constituency
in this way would provoke no voices of protest from the rest of the constituency not directly affected
by the measure.
169. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (holding that a state-owned cement plant
may limit sales to in-state customers).
170. Cf South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (denying market
participant exemption and finding that Alaska's attempts to require in-state processing were downstream
regulation of a separate market in which the state did not participate). When the Wunnicke Court speaks
of impermissible downstream controls, I equate this with its emphasis that the state was acting as
regulator rather than participant. The point is not whether the state regulates, because it always does, but
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The Second Circuit's attempts to recast market participant logic to allow
regulation over parti of the waste market which the state has not entered, and under

C&A Carbone could not completely monopolize, is thus inconsistent with previous
Court logic and case law in other circuits. In Fort Gratiot, for example, the

petitioner landfill persuasively argued to the Court that one reason the St. Clair
county ban on out-of-state waste should be rejected was because the government
was unwilling to assume the economic costs it attempted to impose on the
petitioner's operations. The county could not claim any of the benefits of market
participation - e.g., the ability to exclude out-of-area waste - until it had paid the
actual dollar price of becoming the investment creator of the landfill.
The pre-C&A Carbone case of GSW, Inc. v. Long County" also demonstrates
that the sole qualification for the market participation exemption is the state's expenditure of its own resources. In this contract dispute between a Georgia county and
a private disposal facility operator," Long County attempted to claim market

participant exemptiDn, so that it could impose service area limits on the facility's
operations."

The Long County court rejected claims that the county was acting

as a market participant when it authorized the disposal project to care for its own
waste needs and then tried to impose on the operator geographic origin restrictions
for terms of waste disposal. The court emphasized that no public funds were at

stake, nor had any been put at risk regarding the disposal facility's operations, and
that such public expenditure is the sine qua non of the market participant
exemption.'75 Since the county assumed none of the risks inherent in the operation
of the facility, its attempted source impositions amounted to regulation and capture

of a private entity for public purpose, similar to the economic protectionism

whether it only regulates. The Wunnicke opinion thus should be read as standing for no more than the
proposition that a state's exemption from dormant Commerce Clause constraints extends only so far as
the state actually participates in the market.
171. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13 n.8, FortGratiot (No. 91-636). The argument was that only
if the county was willing to condemn the landfill and pay just compensation would it be entitled to
exclude waste as a marl:et participant. See id.
172. 999 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1993).
173. Actually, the dispute was between the Georgia county and a successor corporation to the
company which originally negotiated with the county. See id. at 1509-10.
174. The county wished to impose a 150 mile geographic limitation on any waste brought to the
disposal facility. See id. at 1509.
175. The court stated:
The County's failure to expend or risk public funds has several ramifications which negate
a finding of market participation. First, it indicates that the County is acting more as a
regulator becaus. its policies affect a private company which incidentally benefits from
the County's policy decision regarding waste disposal ....
Id. at 1513. The court farther elaborates on this point:
In the instant case, the landfill was to be wholly owned by Allsafe, a private company.
Allsafe assumed all risk of failure and liability. Thus, the County was maintaining a policy
which would restrict the return on the investment of private actors and would regulate a
private company. The County was attempting to control a business that happened to
benefit from the County's desire to develop a plan for waste disposal.
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foreclosed by Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot. To obtain the market participant
exemption, the county would have had to put its funds where its regulatory interests
were.
Significantly, the Long County court also recognized that a market participant
need not act like a profit maximizer to retain the exemption. The court cited Reeves
for the proposition that "the market participant doctrine relies upon the premise that
economic restrictions affect both the state actor and other market participants" and
that this serves to justify the economic freedoms to pick and choose customers. 76
The court also explained by example how the market's inherent protection from
abuse works in the market participant waste context. If the county were a market
participant and had invested its own money in the facility, it would have had to
answer to the citizens whose funds had been expended. When the county imposed
a geographic source restriction which decreased profits or increased operating costs,
this might not please voters whose money thus had been managed.'" The citizens
whose funds are being expended are like the shareholders of a corporation who can
vote the management out when their investment is not being properly managed. But
the criteria by which citizens decide what is good or bad public investment is not
solely economic. It is fine if citizens desire to have their money spent to achieve
the policy objectives of limiting geographic sources, because the knowledge that
their funds could have been spent in more economically profitable ways acts as a
constraint on costless attainment of such public benefit. The potential cost to
government of inefficient deals is what entitles it to reap social benefits through
market participation.
The problem with the fiat attempted under the Second Circuit's perversion of
market participation logic is that the government had not yet paid the full price
required for being able to impose unprofitable terms on its citizens. It had not yet
sufficiently subsidized its haulage contract so that its citizens had no viable financial
option but to use the government sponsored service. Absent compelling health and
safety goals that cannot be achieved except through monopoly, the only way to
induce all citizens post-C&A Carboneto use a government designated service is to
subsidize that service with government funds to such extent that all citizens will use
the service because it is in their economic self-interest to do so. In contrast, when
Babylon and Smithtown ordered their citizens to use one approved hauler, this was
costless (to the government) fiated flow control, rather than economic incentive flow
cohtrol.' 78
However, when the state does put up sufficient funds, it may attach whatever
strings it wants. It also retains the ability as regulator to ensure that those not
subject to the strings act in ways which do not harm state citizens. The government

176. Id. at 1513-14.
177. See id. at 1514 n.7.

178. Babylon's flow control regime was even worse than costless, in that the flow control regulation
extorted funds from only a portion of the citizens forced to use the service, which funds were then
directly passed over to the monopolist designated by the government. See supra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text (critiquing in more detail this aspect of the Babylon arrangement).
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always remains the government, whether it participates in markets or not, and one
of the functions of government is to ensure that all operators, subsidized as well as
unsubsidized, act in ways which do not cause harm to the public. Arguments to the
contrary vest private enterprise with substantive due process rights which are not
part of the Court's current constitutional jurisprudence.

Although citizens retain the right under the dormant Commerce Clause to save
money if they can accomplish legitimate health and safety goals at less cost by
seeking the services of an out-of-state merchant, this is not a constitutional
guarantee of the best economic terms per se. Rather, it is an inter-sovereign

guarantee that the eA-onomic activities promoted or approved by one state will be
allowed a chance to compete for market share in other states, on the selling state's
terms.' Fair access is guaranteed; not the right to a particular way of doing

business. The dormant Commerce Clause provides no mandate for doing business
on whatever terms industry thinks are most profitable, nor does it ensure that
business will even bze able to get any customers at all.
Waste industry arguments that the state should lose market participant exemption
when it both regulates and participates are accordingly always wide of the mark
regarding the real basis for the exemption. The key question should never be the
effect of government market participation, but rather the genuineness and the
extent.Y Although this means that private enterprise is deprived of the ability to

179. It is here that I part company with those commentators who see the dormant Commerce Clause
as a guarantee to competition on what they deem economically efficient terms. See, e.g., Gifford, supra
note 7; Kovacs & Ander-onj supra note 7; Schoettle, supra note 7; cf.Collins, supra note 7; Daniel A.
Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GAITs-Eye View of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401 (1994).
The basic problem with instituting any form of economic efficiency as a constitutional value is it runs
contrary to principles of state sovereignty. The protections of the dormant Commerce Clause are
protections which come from federalism. To the extent national markets are truly desirable, the dormant
Commerce Clause protections run to business entities as citizens of the nation, rather than by reason of
economic efficiencies. Sce, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (198 1);
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945). In such situations the Court, as a matter of federal common law, has determined that there can
be only a national market because this is in the public interest.
More often, the dormant Commerce Clause operates only to prohibit economic favoritism. See, e.g.,
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). In such situations, the Court has
determined that out-of-state commerce is either being discriminated against or unduly burdened as a
result of state law. Here, the protections of the dormant Commerce Clause run to business entities as
members of other states which are entitled to be respected as co-equal sovereigns. See supra notes 7,
97 and accompanying text; infra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
180. The question of how much government investment is required post-C&A Carbone to be able
to claim market participnt status thus would need to be addressed. The Long County court correctly
noted that the issue of how much public expenditure must be required before the market participant
exemption can be claimed is a tricky one, but does not require sole government ownership.
The district court appeared to construe the market participant doctrine as requiring state
or county ownership of the landfill. This goes too far. The public entity need not own the
operation to be a market participant, but it must risk or expend public funds in some way.
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compete on equal terms with the state in markets which the state enters, the
alternative would be to deprive government of the ability to act in precisely those
areas about which it is most concerned. The government's concern is proved by the
government's willingness to put up its funds to ensure that things are done in a
certain way. The market participant exemption is thus at the heart of government's
power to act for the benefit of its citizens. Full scale attacks on the market
participant doctrine are essentially arguments for a return to Lochner era views that
private contract rights trump governmental power to act. Unfortunately, some courts
seem eager to push for such an unfettered free market reading of Commerce Clause
requirements, as the next section demonstrates.
IV. Pushing Per Se PresumptionsToo Far
Several lower court decisions depart from prior dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in two significant ways. First, some decisions place new emphasis
upon the purpose behind a regulation's enactment. According to the courts in these
cases, a regulation's purpose is determinative of whether the regulation should be
held invalid. Whereas prior Court precedent used legislative purpose to confirm, in
doubtful areas, whether a regulation unfairly burdens out-of-state interests, the new
emphasis in some lower court decisions effectively bypasses inquiry about effects
of regulation, preferring to focus instead on the motivation behind the regulation.
This trend is dangerous because it allows the judiciary to infringe too much on
legislative powers and processes. The possibility is that judges will invalidate laws
based solely on their displeasure about the legislature's perceived intentions,
regardless of whether there is any real Commerce Clause harm.
The second disturbing lower court development is complementary to, but opposite
of the first. In situations where it is impossible to discern any discriminatory
regulatory benefit to insiders as against outsiders of the same type, some lower
courts nevertheless subject a regulation to the heightened dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny reserved for discrimination situations. They reason that the per se test for
presumptively discriminatory situations should be applied to any situation where
out-of-state interests are extensively affected. Such courts improperly attach the
label of unconstitutional discrimination to regulations which cause an outsider to
lose business, regardless of why that business is lost. The recent decisions thus
convert incidental effect on out-of-state interests into per se discrimination. Such
decisions attempt to reread the dormant Commerce Clause as primarily designed to
protect businesses from state regulation rather than to prevent states from
overreaching.' This trend is dangerous to the extent that it places the citizens of

We decline to define the economic involvement necessary to qualify as a market
participant, but merely note that the facts of this case do not support such a finding ....
GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1513 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993).

181. Such reading of the dormant Commerce Clause also makes what was formerly thought to be
the dominant and appropriate test for dealing with evenhanded regulation - the Pike balancing test effectively surplusage, since almost every state regulation will have some disproportionate effect on some

out-of-state concern.
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every state at the mercy of the morals of the marketplace, effectively vesting
interstate economic aztivity with an immunity from state regulation which has not
been advocated since the Lochner era.
A. Why Regulatory), Sticks and Stones Alone Should Be Counted as Breaking
Commerce Clause Bones
The factual background surrounding passage of state legislation or of a local
ordinance may help confirm what the legislation accomplishes. But courts should
not find violations of the dormant Commerce Clause unless there is likely to be
actual discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. Nor should heightened scrutiny
be applied to legislative enactments which actually do not discriminate against
interstate commerce, regardless of what motivated their enactment. For example,

one can imagine communities so opposed to the importation of out-of-state trash
that they would be willing to pay more to ship all their own locally generated trash

elsewhere, if that is the price required to ensure no out-of-state trash ever enters
their borders. An absolute ban on landfilling in the community would accomplish
this result, and such an evenhanded ban should not be found to violate the dormant
Commerce Clause." This would be true despite explicit uncontradicted (or even

admitted) proof that the sole motivation for passing the local landfill ban was to
exclude out-of-state trash." One does not have to endorse such selfish NIMBYism'" in order to endorse the principle that the dormant Commerce Clause does
not protect against such selfishness. A potential landfill operator does not have a
vested right to operate in communities which, for whatever reasons, have decided
that there will be no landfilling.'"

182. See, e.g., Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding
that zoning regulations which prevent landfill expansion do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause);
see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court's opinion leaves states only the option of banning all trash if they wish to avoid health harms
associated with out-of-state trash); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (making a similar argument); cf. Gary D. Peake Excavating, Inc. v. Town
Board of Hancock, 93 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting any dumping of
waste in town except for limited quantities at town-owned transfer facility did not violate Commerce
Clause).
183. Cf. Cox, supra note 21, at 625 n.291 (describing unreported Kentucky landfill case with such
factual background). For subsequent history of this case, see Eastern Ky. Resources v. Fiscal Court of
Magoffin County, No. 95-6360, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 28528 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1997).
184. For a discussion of NIMBYism, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
185. It is a closer call when a local community which has already solved its own disposal problems
for locally generated trash, by locking up long-term contracts for local dumping, refuses to site any
additional facilities in the area because there is no need for them, and because the town wishes no influx
of out-of-state trash. Even here, however, I believe the community would have the right to so exclude.
First, whatever "deal" the town has worked in regard to its own disposal may not be as airtight as it supposes. If any unconstitutional restrictions, such as prohibiting importation of others' trash, or allowing
a local permit only on condition that the operator provide for local needs, dre attached to the guaranteed
capacity for in-area disposal, the operator would be in a good position, post-Fort Gratiotand post-C&A
Carbone, to challenge such conditions. If the community never had a right costlessly to lock up private
disposal capacity for its own use, prior attempts to coerce this am constitutionally suspect. Assuming,
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Some courts, nevertheless, have come close to embracing a doctrine of
unconstitutionality based solely on intentions. In SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota,'"
for example, the Eighth Circuit separately analyzed, apart from any discriminatory
effect or language it might have, an enactment which allowed direct referendum on
a proposed landfill. The court wanted to know whether the measure had been
enacted for a discriminatory purpose.'6 The court asserted that "the presence of
a discriminatory purpose is one of three ways to trigger strict scrutiny."'" Finding
that the referendum at issue was certified and enacted for a discriminatory purpose,
the court implied that this alone would be independent grounds for imposing
heightened scrutiny which would lead to constitutional invalidity.s'
While I do not quarrel with the particular result of having this South Dakota
referendum declared unconstitutional, I do object to having per se scrutiny applied
to a legislative or electoral act based on the motivations behind its passage. By
subjecting South Dakota's referendum vote to a per se test of unconstitutionality, the
Eighth Circuit impermissibly attributed to South Dakota voters intentions they may
or may not have possessed. For example, the votes of those who opposed any
landfilling, regardless of origin of the trash, or of those who opposed large volume
landfill operations because of their increased nuisance aspects or their concentrated
waste volumes, were alike counted as being unconstitutionally aimed against the
SDDS facility based on the origin of its trash."9 Not all voters may have been
motivated by the desire to exclude out-of-state trash.
I hasten to emphasize, however, that why South Dakota voters pulled levers one
way or the other should not determine the constitutionality of their actions. Courts
should not snoop behind the closed curtain of the ballot booth. Why voters either
approve or disapprove a proposed landfill is irrelevant to whether their referendum
should be counted valid. The fundamental problem in the Eighth Circuit's
willingness to rule based on its independent assessment of electoral motivation, is
that this intrudes directly into fundamental democratic processes. To make
constitutionality potentially hinge on actual motivations for casting ballots, either of
individual voters or of legislators, transforms courts into thought police.

however, that the prior disposal deal was entered into in an arms-length kind of way (for example, by
locking up only part of the capacity of the local landfill at fair market rates), the situation seems
indistinguishable from one where the community goes outside of the area to take care of its trash needs.
The fact that a community has been able to take care of its disposal needs should not prevent it from
continuing to regulate evenhandedly against further landfill harms, even if this is motivated primarily or
solely by bias against out-of-state trash. Should its deal fall through (say the landfill is closed because

of lack of compliance with state regulations), the community would be back on the competitive fair
market street looking for disposal capacity. Its prior benefits, if obtained solely as a matter of market
participant contracts, should not obligate it to give proposed new operators something they have no
inherent right to demand.
186. 47 F.3d 263 (8th Cir. 1995).
187. See id.
at 268-70.
188. Id.
at 268.
189. See id.
at 268-70.
190. See id.
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If South Dakota's referendum was invalid, this was not because of the actual
motivation of the vcters, but rather because the referendum vote lacked standards
for decision making where standards were inherently required. In other words, the
referendum violated due process, not the dormant Commerce Clause.'92 Under due

process, SDDS may have had a right to know why it was being denied the use of
its property." A standardless electoral referendum could not provide such
information.
Although the SDDS court focused on these issues of standardless decision
making," it mislabeled them as raising dormant Commerce Clause concern. It is
important to correct such mislabeling because of the difference in the type of test

the Court might impose under each clause. Whereas a challenge to legislative action
under the due process clause requires a means-end analysis that is deferential to the
state as legislator," a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, under heightened
scrutiny such as the Eighth Circuit is advocating, would almost certainly doom any
state legislation found to have had improper motivation."' I 'eemphasize that I
have no trouble with South Dakota's referendum being invalidated under a due
process analysis, given the relative impossibility of showing how means would
match ends on South Dakota's facts." There should be considerable pause,
however, before courts expand the per se dormant Commerce Clause test to
situations based on the judiciary's conclusion that legislators were improperly
motivated.
Given a pdtentially proper holding on other grounds, the SDDS decision could be

discounted as a matter of aberrational confusion, but for the fact that at least one
191. Cf. Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that
a statutory provision giving administrative officials power to deny landfill permits solely on the basis of
adverse public sentiment was not rationally related to health and safety goals for which permit denial
could be based and therefore violated due process). The Hamrick court emphasized that the administrative official was given no criteria by which to evaluate public sentiment and that some such
criteria rationally related to public welfare, however broadly construed, were necessary to a land use law.
See id. at 666-67.

192. Reasons for needing to know the basis for permit denial would include the ability to have
grounds for substantive appeal, as well as the practical goal of perhaps desiring to bring one's conduct
into conformity with what the voters desired, so that they might approve a differently structured facility.
Some standardless votes are of course inherently permissible within a representative democracy. A vote
to elect representatives for the populace requires no substantive standards, the representative being
justifiably chosen if the voters merely feel "we like her - we think she'll do OK by us." When the
voters act by referendum in a legislative or administrative capacity, however, their actions are subject
to the same constraints a; those of other legislators or quasi-legislators.
193. See SDDS, 47 F.3d at 269.
194. This is so regrdless of the apparent motivation of the legislator except in certain suspect
classification 'or fundamental rights areas. Cf. generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. Rav. 1689 (1984) (comparing approaches under the dormant Commerce,
Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses)
195. The SDDS court frankly admitted as much. See SDDS, 47 F.3d at 268 n.8.
196. A referendum, because it is inherently standardless, cannot be the proper vehicle for
determining propriety of land-use. South Dakota's referendum was a more direct violation of due process
than the indirect reliance upon adverse public sentiment declared unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit
in Hamrick. See supra note 191.
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other circuit has embraced similar logic, with a more questionable result. In

Chambers Medical Technologies of South Carolinav. Bryant,"9' the Fourth Circuit
remanded to the district court specifically for that court to determine whether a
South Carolina limit on the amount of medical waste which could be incinerated instate was enacted with discriminatory motivation." 8 What is particularly troubling
about the remand is that the court remanded only after finding that the cap on waste
incineration did not discriminate against interstate commerce in its practical
effect.'" Because the private facility that was involved could completely ignore
in-state generators when selling its limited private capacity, there was no

discrimination against interstate commerce by the cap provision alone.'

If I am

reading the opinion correctly, the district court was invited to strike down legislation
which the appellate court found did not burden interstate commerce.
The Eighth and Fourth Circuits offered in support of these novel propositions
largely the same Supreme Court case law, which both circuits misconstrued. Both
courts cited Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission2" for the
proposition that a finding of discriminatory purpose triggers heightened scrutiny.'
The relevant portion of Hunt instead merely draws attention to the fact that the

Court did not rest its decision upon a determination of the legislative intent in that
case, since the discriminatory effect of the statute was so clear.' The importance
of legislative intent in Hunt was that it helped confirm that the statute was designed
to, and therefore likely would, cause harm to Washington producers at the expense

197. 52 F.3d 1252 (4th Cir. 1995).
198. See id.
at 1260, 1266.
199. See id.
at 1258.
200. See id. The court also suggested, however, via footnote, that there might be independent
grounds for heightened scrutiny because an exemption from the cap requirements had been granted to
in-state hospitals which disposed of their own infectious waste on-site and not-for-profit. The lower court
was only to address this issue, however, after it determined whether the legislation setting an overall cap
was enacted with discriminatory intention. See id.at 1260 n. 11.
201. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See supranote 39 for a brief description of the Hunt facts and holding.
202. See Chambers Medical, 52 F.3d at 1259; SDDS, 47 F.3d at 268.
203. The Hunt Court wrote:
Despite the statute's facial neutrality, the Commission suggests that its discriminatory
impact on interstate commerce was not an unintended byproduct and there are some
indications in the record to that effect. The most glaring is the response of the North
Carolina Agriculture Commissioner to the Commission's request for an exemption
following the statute's passage in which he indicated that before he could support such an
exemption, he would "want to have the sentiment from our apple producers since they
were mainly responsiblefor this legislation being passed ....
Moreover, we find it somewhat suspect that North Carolina singled out only closed
containers of apples, the very means by which apples are transported in commerce, to
effectuate the statute's ostensible consumer protection purpose when apples are not
generally sold at retail in their shipping containers. However, we need not ascribe an
economic protection motive to the North Carolina Legislature to resolve this case; we
conclude that the challenged statute cannot stand insofar as it prohibits the display of
Washington State grades even if enacted for the declared purpose of protecting consumers
from deception and fraud in the marketplace.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352-53 (citation omitted).
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of North Carolina apple growers. It is a large jump from this dicta to the assertion
that courts should inquire more intensely about legislative intent in order to find a
new and independent ground for applying heightened scrutiny.
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the other case primarily relied upon by the
lower courts, the Court stated that "[a] finding that state legislation constitutes
'economic protectionism' may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose,
or discriminatory effect."' The actual analysis in Bacchus Imports, however, was
not to analyze legislative intent in a vacuum, but to use evidence of legislative
purpose to confirm presumptions that the challenged statute would benefit in-state
business at the expense of out-of-state enterprises. Thus, the Bacchus Imports Court
continually emphasized that improving the competitive position of native wines and
liquors against outside products was both the intended purpose and the actual result
of the legislation. ' Absent such finding of discriminatory effect, it is far from
clear that the Bacchu Court would have ruled Hawaii's enactments invalid on the
basis of intent alone. When intent alone was focused on in the case, it was in the
context of Hawaii's arguments that proof of a nonprotectionist intent might justify
its legislation.a The Court properly countered that well-motivated intentions
cannot overcome clearly discriminatory effects, and that Hawaii's arguments about
positive intent to help its own industries were not valid anyway, since an intent to
benefit one industry concomitantly conveys an intent to harm its competitors."°
Nowhere in the Bacchus Imports case did the Court rule that the legislative purpose
it had discerned was alone determinative of Commerce Clause result, as the Eighth
and Fourth Circuits advocate.
The difference in the Court's approach regarding intent versus that of the SDDS
and Chambers Medical courts is nowhere more clear than in Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co.." In that case, responding to arguments that Minnesota's ban
on the sale of milk in plastic jugs was motivated by the economic protectionist goal
of helping the Minnesota pulp wood industry,"' the Court did not remand for

204. 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (holding that tax exemption for locally produced pineapple liquor had
economic protectionist mctive and could not be justified as a purported attempt to assist or subsidize
local industry).
205. Id.at 270 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
206. See id at 271-73.

207. See id. at 273. Hawaii argued that its tax break for local wines was not meant to harm other
products but merely to help Hawaii's products. Additionally, Hawaii argued that its aid to afledgling

industry should be viewed differently from aid to an established industry. See id. at 272. The Court
rejected both claims.
208. See id. at 273.
209. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court upheld a state ban on the sale of
milk in nonreturnable nonrefillable plastic jugs on the grounds that Minnesota was entitled to promote
recycling. See idat 470, 473. Significantly, Minnesota did not ban the sale of milk in nonreturnable
nonrefillable paperboard containers, and the pulpwood industry (suppliers for paperboard products) had

significant Minnesota connections, while the more nationally dominant milk plastics industry had none.
The Court nevertheless gave presumptive weight to Minnesota's stated legislative purpose because it bore
a rational relationship to conservation purposes. See id at 470.
210. See id. at 460, 473.
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additional fact finding on this issue. Instead, the Court deferred to Minnesota's
stated environmental purpose which accompanied the legislation,"' despite explicit
findings by the trial court that Minnesota's legislation was motivated by intent to
discriminate."' As it is clear from other Court precedent that legislative statement
of intent alone does not establish the reality of legislative purpose,213 this deference
to Minnesota's stated legislative purpose cannot be based on the Court's "trust" of
Minnesota's stated legislative motivations.214 It is a much fairer reading of the
Court's discussion of legislative intent in Clover Leaf Creamery to view intent as
mainly irrelevant to the Court's inquiry about whether legislation really regulates
evenhandedly; or instead discriminates in effect against interstate commerce.1

Instead of supporting the Eighth or Fourth Circuit notions that inquiry into
legislative motivation should become a primary concern of courts adjudicating
Commerce Clause attacks, the Clover LeafCreamery message seems squarely to the
opposite.
In sum, the Court seems never to have made intent determinative in its
Commerce Clause analysis, although opportunities to go down that path have been

factually presented to it several times. The Court's wisdom in not emphasizing what
actually motivates legislation is clear. Although a proper Commerce Clause inquiry

should focus on both intent and effect, it should declare unconstitutional only
legislation that has a discriminatory effect. Courts may properly use information
about discriminatory legislative intent to more carefully scrutinize purportedly
evenhanded measures. This is so because it is likely that regulations enacted out of
prejudice will in fact more likely harm interstate commerce than would rules

211. See id. at 471-73 (including internal references to id. at 465-70). The Court also noted that
Minnesota's legislation could have been motivated at least partially by environmental concerns, and
emphasized that, regardless of its motivation, it regulated evenhandedly. See id.
212. See id. at 460, 463 n.7.
213. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (indicating that only
a foolish legislature would artlessly disclose an intent to discriminate).
214. The Court is quite willing to go behind a stated legislative purpose when it realizes or suspects
that the legislation really will have an impermissibly detrimental effect on interstate commerce. See supra
notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
215. This is confirmed by the essentially cavalier way the Court subsumed the Commerce Clause
discussion of legislative motivation into its discussion of legitimacy of legislative purpose under equal
protection analysis. See Clover Leaf Creamery,449 U.S. at 471 n.15. Since, under equal protection, the
statement of a conceivable legislative purpose, whether it actually motivated the legislation or not, is
usually seen as sufficient to protect the legislation from attack in all but suspect classification cases, if
the Court had wanted to institute a more demanding standard for Commerce Clause scrutiny of legislative
motivation, it certainly had opportunity to do so in Clover Leaf Creamery,where the analysis in the case
proceeded separately under Equal Protection and Commerce Clause grounds. Instead, the Court
summarily dealt with the Commerce Clause intent arguments by stating, "We have already considered
and rejected this argument in the equal protection context.., and do so in this context as well." Id. The
Court also emphasized that it would "not invalidate a state statute under the Equal Protection Clause
merely because some legislators sought to obtain votes for the measure on the basis of its beneficial side
effects on state industry." I&aat 463 n.7. By conflating the analysis of intent under the dormant
Commerce Clause with such analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, the Clover Leaf CreameryCourt
was properly emphasizing that the real interest under dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny is not
motivation but likely or actual effect.
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enacted without such motivations. 16 But if a measure truly regulates evenhandedly, the intent behind its passage should be irrelevant to further Commerce Clause
inquiry. We do not want an unelected judiciary invalidating elected law-makers'
actions on the basis of nothing more substantial than that the judges are convinced
the lawmakers were improperly motivated.
B. Why We Should Not Recycle Substantive Economic Due Process Through the
Dormant Commerce Clause
A finding of discriminatory effect can alone lead to a ruling of Commerce Clause
unconstitutionality. As the first sections of this article demonstrate, the current
Court increasingly has emphasized the illegitimacy of differential effects, regardless
of how well intentioned the legislators' motivations or how unintended the
differential impact on out-of-state commerce. The per se test thus has trumped
benign legislative purpose. Nevertheless, even with this increased emphasis on the
illegitimacy of differential effects, harmful does not mean harmful in the eye of the
out-of-state beholder. Harm in a dormant Commerce Clause sense only occurs if
similarly situated in-state and out-of-state parties are treated differently as a direct
result of the regulation involved. In their rush to embrace the current Court's
emphasis on illegitimacy of differential impact, some courts are too eager to claim
that any harmful effects to out-of-state business equals unconstitutional Commerce
Clause harm.
These lower courts are over-applying the per se test to evenhanded regulations.
They are abandoning the Pike balancing test in favor of strict scrutiny whenever
some particular aspect of out-of-state commerce is presumed or shown to suffer
more than a different aspect of in-state commerce as a result of state regulation.
This, however, makes the Pike balancing test effectively surplusage, since harms
would never need to be balanced against benefits under Pike if the per se test were
triggered every time harm occurs more to out-of-state than in-state interests. In fact,
many times when the Court previously applied Pike, or a similarly deferential test,
2
there was disproportionate effect on outside interests compared to insiders. "
Nevertheless, the Court applied the balancing test rather than the per se rule of
invalidity. By jumping to the per se test based solely on harm to particular out-ofstate interests, some lower courts are running contrary to Court precedent and
effectively immunizing interstate business from state regulation. These courts

216. Even commentitors who have emphasized the illegitimacy of discriminatory intent as the
cornerstone of their dormint Commerce Clause analysis have preserved some possibility for unintended
harm to interstate commerce to be upheld as permissibly incidental. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 7, at
1233-44.
217. See, e.g., Berclay's Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (California
apportionment formula lads to multiple taxation on multi-national corporations); Trinova Corp. v.
Michigan Dep't of Treas., 498 U.S. 358 (1991) (Michigan apportionment formula results in greater tax
liability for outsiders who have only sales in Michigan); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981) (out-of-state plastics producers would feel effect of regulation); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (national refiners, outsiders, would feel effects of Maryland's
prohibition).
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misread the basic purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause as being to protect
business interests per se rather than to prevent discrimination against outside
interests. Such return to Lochner-style constitutional valuing of private economic
rights is not warranted under the dormant Commerce Clause.
In Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh1t (Government
Suppliers I1'), for example, the Seventh Circuit applied the per se test to all
aspects of challenged Indiana waste legislation. The legislation required that trucks
which haul waste in Indiana not be used for other purposes, required waste
transporting vehicles to be registered and stickered, and authorized compensatory
fees to be charged for the costs imposed on Indiana by out-of-state waste. Only the
last provision was facially discriminatory.' Although the first two aspects of the
legislation applied equally to in-state and out-of-state carriers of trash, the
Government Suppliers II court emphasized that just because a statute does not
discriminate on its face and purports to regulate evenhandedly, the reviewing court
must still seriously examine the enactment to determine if it nevertheless
discriminates impermissibly against interstate commerce.' So far, so good.
Certainly cases like Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madisonm and Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission,2" cited by the Government Suppliers II
court,' 4 stand for the proposition that a claim of technical evenhandedness will not
prevent heightened scrutiny, if the effects of discrimination are clearly evident, and
if local benefits are questionable.

218. 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992).
219. For more on the previous history to the Government Suppliers litigation, see id. at 1272.
220. See id. at 1270-71, 1271 n.4. Indiana's compensatory waste fees were clearly unconstitutional
under Oregon Waste. See supra notes 51-74 and accompanying text (describing the rationale of the
Oregon Waste case). I focus here only on those aspects of the Indiana legislation which operated facially
evenhandedly.
221. See Government Suppliers, 975 F.2d at 1278.
222. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
223. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
224. See Government Suppliers, 975 F.2d at 1278-79.
225. For discussion of Dean Milk and Hunt, see supra notes 38-40. The Government Suppliers 11
court misread Dean Milk and Hunt to support its analysis. The point of Dean Milks requirement that
courts look behind facial neutrality, since legislatures do not usually "artlessly disclose[ ] an avowed
purpose to discriminate," was to find out if the measure actually is aimed at out-of-state interests despite
its language. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). Similarly, when North
Carolina in Hunt prohibited Washington from including nonharmful apple grading information on apples
coming into North Carolina, the Court was able to look behind the facial neutrality of the statute to
discern its true purpose. In both situations, the Court was really inquiring about the legitimacy of the
local purpose and finding that its facial neutrality did not help the statute; both statutory schemes on
quick analysis proved to be designed to further economic protectionism by being aimed at outsiders.
While the Government Suppliers II court could have similarly found, after identifying illusory local
benefits, economic protectionism to be the true underlying motivation of the statutory scheme before it,
this is not how Government Suppliers 11 proceeded. The Government Suppliers II court felt it did not
need to investigate whether the local purpose was sham or legitimate, so long as the facts indicated that
harms fell disproportionately on outsiders. This telescoping of economic effect into economic
protectionism, when there is admittedly evenhanded application, is a severe misreading of how and when
courts should apply the heightened. scrutiny and Pike balancing tests.
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But the Government Suppliers II court went further, using presumed economic
effect on particular outsiders as complete proof of improper discrimination. The
court argued that if trucks were required to be semi-dedicated to trash hauling rather
than able to haul whatever they want, shipping costs for out-of-staters would
effectively double. Out-of-state trash therefore would not come to Indiana.' The
court thus accepted the trash brokers' arguments that an act discriminates for
Commerce Clause purposes if it primarily affects interstate business. 7 The
problem with this analysis is that it means a regulating state remains at the mercy
of status quo ways of doing business. Whenever state regulation would have a
disproportionate effect on out-of-state business the way it currently is done, the state
would be unable to regulate at all.
Even if the Government Suppliers ! court suspected that the Indiana back-hauling
ban was sham regulation, proof of effect on outsiders should not alone have
triggered determinative per se scrutiny. The court should have explained how the
disproportionate impact, combined with weak evidence of the need for a ban,
constituted presumptive discriminationm Jumping to per se scrutiny based solely
on presumed effect on outsiders gives no room for legitimate local purpose to be
accomplished in situations where the inevitable result will be some effect on out-ofstate interests. Eliminating backhauling, for example, will always place a greater
burden on outsiders than local haulers, since only outsiders are engaged in longdistance hauling. But if there really are legitimate health and safety concerns
involved in transporting consumer foodstuffs in trucks which have just carried trash,
it should not matter that long-haulers are more affected by the regulation.
Indiana's legislation likely would have fallen even under Pike balancing.
Alternative means of addressing health harms, such as required sanitizing of vans,
could have been used. Additionally, the legislation seemed aimed more to harass
the waste hauling industry than to accomplish legitimate health and safety
objectives.' But under the approach of using any differential effect to trigger
heightened scrutiny, far more legitimate regulations will be vulnerable to
constitutional challenge under the per se test. To stick with the concerns raised by
backhauling, for example, if Indiana wished to impose the requirement of either
sanitizing or dedicating the fleet for vehicles which carry trash, such measures
would still be felt primarily by out-of-staters, since locally generated trash would
already likely be hauled in dedicated vehicles that did not make return commercial
runs. If the per se test were applied to such measures because of their clearly
differential effect oil out-of-state business, sanitizing or dedication might not be

226. See Government Suppliers, 975 F.2d at 1273.
227. See id. at 1278.
228. See id. at 1278-79 (describing the motivation behind the legislative enactments).
229. On the Government Suppliers 11 facts it might not have been too difficult to find that the
purported local benefits were indeed a sham pretext for keeping out out-of-state trash. Indiana offered
no evidence of harm having occurred because of backhauling. Perhaps more importantly, the absolute
ban on backhauling left no room for transporters to attempt to address health harms by alternative means
such as required sanitizing of vans.
230. See id. at 1278-80.
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capable of being shown to be the only ways to prevent health harms. But surely,
contrary to the Seventh Circuit's parochially expressed concerns about extraterritoriality,"' Indiana has some right to regulate against the health harms caused by
trash trucks which first dump in the state and then carry their germs elsewhere. A
requirement that fleets either be dedicated or sanitized seems to be a reasonable
method of regulating in an area of legitimate concern. Something less rigorous than
a per se presumption of invalidity should be applied to such regulation. Other
examples of differential effects that inevitably result from legitimately motivated
regulations come easily to mind. 2 The battle over whether the per se test should
replace Pike in such situations is far from theoretical, 3 and will have significant
implications for many non-waste regulatory situations.
The Government Suppliers II approach is unfortunately no isolated occurrence.
In Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin the Eighth Circuit invalidated a
county ordinance which directed all compostable waste to a county composting
facility, emphasizing the harm to a particularout-of-state disposal landfill (which
otherwise would receive the waste) as proof of impermissible discrimination
requiring heightened scrutiny. 5 The fact that a particular out-of-state facility was
severely impacted by the county's ordinance, however, should not in and of itself
have triggered heightened scrutiny. Flow control is not unconstitutional under the
C&A Carbone rationale because any particular facility loses business, but rather
because all businesses are prohibited from competing with the government favored
facility.
If courts focus on impact to a particular business as proof of Commerce Clause
discrimination, this completely ties a community's regulatory hands. The local
community is prohibited from passing any regulation which prevents its citizens
from doing business with out-of-staters on terms different from the status quo, even
if the regulating state has come to believe that the way the particular out-of-staters
do their business raises serious health and safety concerns. For example, the Waste
231. See id. at 1279-80 (suggesting that Indiana's interest in public health and safety concerns is
limited to protecting its reputation for quality goods, should others elsewhere be contaminated, rather than
in protecting out-of-staters directly from health harm risks).
232. Requiring a manifest documenting where waste has been may legitimately deter improper loads
being mixed with proper loads, but will inevitably impose more burden upon waste which has been
through more hands, and such waste is usually out-of-state waste which has moved through transfer
stations. Any upstream inspections of how waste is handled are likely to be more costly for those further
from the point of ultimate disposal, but may be more effective in identifying improper waste than
disassembling compacted waste at its ultimate disposal point. Requiring that waste have certain kinds of
recyclables removed may reflect proper local judgments about reserving capacity for what truly needs
to be buried, but inevitably will also be at odds with out-of-state or national standard practice. Any such
"quality" or processing requirements will also inevitably be more easily standardized regarding locally
generated waste, since all such waste will likely be required to conform, whereas only that part of out-ofstate waste destined for the local disposal site which has the unique requirements will be required to
conform.
233. For examples, see supra note 232.
234. 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993).
235. See, e.g., id. at 1387.
236. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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Systems court considered it irrelevant that the county facility to which waste was to
be flow controlled was a composting facility, while the out-of-state landfill which
lost business via the flow control was a landfill.' Does this mean that the Waste
Systems court would have declared unconstitutional a ban on disposing of

compostable materials in landfills, since such a ban just as fully would have taken
away fees the Iowa landfill formerly received for Minnesota trash? It is hardly clear
that the Waste Systems court would go so far, since this would metamorphose
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny under the per se test unambiguously into

protection of interstate economic business relationships per se." My point is that
an expanded per se test merely masks this protection afforded status quo economic

interests, and is for that reason to be rejected.
The reasoning of cases like Waste Systems is flatly inconsistent with prior Court
precedent. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., for example, the Court
applied the Pike test, despite the certainty of differential harm to out-of-state
interests relative to Minnesota businesses.' When Minnesotans were prohibited

from buying milk in disposable plastic containers, this ban both harmed the out-ofstate plastics industry and helped in-state paper container producers. Nevertheless,
the Court allowed Minnesota's environmental goal of keeping nondegradable plastics
out of landfills to triumph over these effects on interstate commerce. In Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,"I the Court even more explicitly emphasized that
"[t]he fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies

does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate com-

merce."" 2 The Exxon Court further emphasized that the Commerce Clause does

not protect "the particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market,"

3

nor guarantee consumers that they will receive a supposed best price from free
market operations.' Unfortunately, some of the most recent garbage cases seem

237. In other words, the composting facility by its very nature accomplished a legitimate
environmental goal of red icing the flow of all waste that otherwise would go into landfills. See Waste
Systems, 985 F.2d at 1383 n.2. Reducing the flow of all waste is stated to be a permissible goal under
Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
238. This hypotheticrl ban on disposal method merely pushes the fallacious rationale of the Waste
Systems opinion to its (il)lcgical conclusion. Harm to any particular facility should not count if regulatory
measures are evenhanded. The Commerce Clause only protects the right to compete on equal terms with
one's competitors. It does not vest a particular way of doing business with constitutional protection.
239. 449 U.S. 456 (1981); see also supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text (analyzing Clover
Leaf Creamery in context of arguments about improper purpose).
240. As the Court explained: "A non-discriminatory regulation serving substantial state purposes is
not invalid simply because it causes some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-state industry
to a predominantly in-state industry." Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 474.
241. 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (holding that a statute, enacted during an oil crisis, prohibiting producers
or refiners from operating retail service stations within Maryland and requiring them to extend price
reductions uniformly to all stations they supply, did not violate dormant Commerce Clause).
242. Id. at 126.
243. Id.at 127.
244. See, e.g., id. at 128 ("It may be true that the consuming public will be injured by the loss of
the high-volume, low-priced stations operated by the independent refiners, but again that argument relates
to the wisdom of the statute, not to its burden on commerce.")
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to be proceeding as if Clover Leaf Creamery and Exxon had not squarely addressed,
and squarely rejected the very arguments industry advocates are still making.us
The mistaken analysis of Government Suppliers II and Waste Systems, for
example, was more recently repeated in the SDDS decision, which I previously
criticized for its improper reliance upon legislative intent.' As alternative ground
for its holding of dormant Commerce Clause unconstitutionality, the Eighth Circuit
applied heightened scrutiny based on differential effect. The SDDS court reasoned
that since South Dakota could not generate enough trash by itself to support a large

scale facility, any ban on large scale trash processing facilities must be per se aimed
at out-of-state trash.

7

Thus South Dakota, under the SDDS court's logic,

presumptively would be prohibited by the per se test from imposing bans on landfill
capacity, even though the United States Supreme Court in prior dicta approvingly
cited just such measures as being quintessentially evenhanded regulation that should
withstand dormant Commerce Clause attack under Pike.' The dormant Commerce Clause does not grant out-of-state corporations a constitutional right to megalandfill in South Dakota, SDDS to the contrary. 9

245. In fairness to the Government Suppliers!! court, it should be noted that this panel attempted
to distinguish Exxon as a case where there was no effect on the interstate flow of goods. See Government
Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Exxon, 437
U.S. at 126 n.16). The problem with this is that the Exxon Court did not make that point the central
aspect of its analysis, but merely used this as additional evidence on the facts before the Court to defeat
arguments of discrimination. The main point of Exxon was that there is no vested right to a national
market or particular market share, so long as a state is regulating evenhandedly to accomplish an
arguably legitimate local purpose. In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court directly rejected arguments that
a shift in business from out-of-state to in-state concerns would constitute discrimination per se, properly
citing Exxon as support for this proposition. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
473-74 (1981).
246. See supra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
247. See SDDS, Inc., v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 270-71 (8th Cir. 1995).
248. See Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Himt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
249. The actual result in SDDS was invalidation of the facility-specific referendum that defeated
SDDS's application for a landfill permit, rather than invalidation of any across-the-board limit on landfill
capacity. See, e.g., SDDS, 47 F.3d at 272. Hopefully, if confronted with the actual situation of an
evenhanded regulation that disproportionately affects out-of-state interests, the Eighth Circuit would back
away from its rhetoric advocating out-of-state business's right to establish large scale facilities in South
Dakota, regardless of why South Dakota might not want such large scale facilities. Nevertheless, the
current emphasis in that part of the SDDS opinion applying effect-based heightened scrutiny is as pro-free
market as any Chicago-school law professor might desire. Improperly likening the "discrimination"
against a large scale facility to the impermissible discrimination the Court found in Hunt, the SDDS court
argued:
Hunt was a case where North Carolina sought to eliminate Washington's competitive
advantages, so that North Carolina farmers could usurp part of the North Carolina apple
market that belonged to Washington growers. Here South Dakota is attempting to exclude
out-of-state trash that has a "negative" value, thus forcing other states to bear the cost of
disposing of the trash when the market would otherwise dispose of the trash in South
Dakota. Any distinction between these two species of protectionism is of no consequence... (B]ecause the garbage market of South Dakota is such that the referendum so
predominantly affects only out-of-staters, we believe that the referendum of S.B. 169 is
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The Government Suppliers II, Waste Systems and SDDS courts' attempts to

substitute economic impact for Commerce Clause analysis represent a disturbing
trend in lower court waste decisions of reading the Commerce Clause as designed

to protect status quo economic arrangements rather than to prevent state overreaching.' Although states may not help their own at the expense of those
similarly situated elsewhere, states are not prohibited by the dormant Commerce

Clause from regulating evenhandedly, even when this has an incidental and
disproportionate effect on out-of-state business. Philadelphia, Fort Gratiot,
Chemical Waste Management and Oregon Waste invalidated bans and fees which
attempted to impose the costs of state waste planning on outsiders, but they have

not enshrined private waste industry methods of dealing with waste problems as
protected interstate commerce which cannot be intruded upon without constitutional
violation. Similarly, although C&A Carbone emphasized that prohibiting competition via flow control is unconstitutional, it did not guarantee particular
competitor waste handlers a piece of any particular garbage pie. The lower court
decisions here criticized, however, appear to wish to guarantee, under the dormant
Commerce Clause, a constitutional right for particular types of out-of-state
businesses, or even particular out-of-state business entities, to operate without being
impeded by state ::egulation. Depriving states of the ability to regulate evenhanded-

ly, and attempting to enshrine free market values within the Constitution, are trends
which the Court should reject and correct at its first opportunity.
V. Conclusion

Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine consists of balancing the state's right to
regulate and promote for the benefit of its own against outsiders' rights not to be
gouged. On the one hand, a state must have power to regulate - the unfettered free
market may produce injustices, or cause health and safety problems inimical to the

welfare of its people. On the other hand, if a state attempts to foist the bill for its
regulatory actions onto out-of-staters disproportionate to the harms they have caused

or are likely to cause, this basic gouging of the unrepresented for others' benefit
discriminatory in effect, and must receive strict scrutiny.
Id. at 271.
The most obviour problem with the SDDS court's revisionist reading of Hunt is that it equates burden
to a national market with impermissible protectionism. North Carolina's regulation in Hunt was invalid
because it excluded outsiders from the very market in which the state's own producers were still
competing. If North Carolina had banned the sale of all apples in the state (say, perhaps because of a
newly discovered risk of cancer associated with apples), this would raise very different kinds of
Commerce Clause rxguments than the North Carolina regulation which promoted the consumption of
North Carolina apples at the expense of Washington produce.
250. See also, e.g., Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Callaghan, No. 5:93CV189, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17490 (N.D. W. Va. September 28, 1995) (invalidating a capacity limitation on sewage sludge to be
disposed of at landfills partly based on legislative history indicating out-of-state waste was attracted to
West Virginia by its; more lax standards and partly on basis that tonnage limitations were set too low for
operators to get business to which court believed they were entitled); Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast
Ala. Solid Wasle Disposal Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993), af'd, 29 F.3d 641 (11th Cir.
1994); City of Auburn v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc., 630 A.2d 227 (Me. 1993).
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should be struck down. Similarly, if a state attempts through its regulatory powers,
instead of expending its own resources, to give its citizens or businesses a
competitive advantage over outsiders, this, too, is offensive to the notions of coequal sovereignty and shared federal citizenship essential to our constitutional
federalism.
Recent waste cases highlight these basic dilemmas of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, but also demonstrate potentially disturbing trends. These trends could
take dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in less balanced directions, if certain
tendencies are not checked or corrected. Accordingly, I offer three concluding
pieces of advice to those who have sympathy for striking a proper Commerce
Clause balance. First, for those who might be frustrated with the handcuffs which
the Court has placed on state regulators, I advise patience and honesty about what
the Court has said. It is no good pretending the Court has not ruled what it has
ruled. Ignoring or unfaithfully bending clearly controlling precedents is likely to do
more damage in the long run than trying to act within the constraints of unsympathetic decisions which nevertheless leave room to accomplish legitimate goals,
albeit at greater cost. In the current revival climate related to pro-market mythology,
the risk of reaction and boomerang against legitimate state action is significant
enough that short term victories on unconstitutional terms should not be attempted.
My other two pieces of advice are for the Court itself, and for all other members
of the judiciary not yet seized of the "free-markets-are-in-the-constitution" disease.
First, it might be productive for the Court to reconsider its recent inflexibility about
the need to first determine what test must be applied. This insistence on first
pigeon-holing has come at the expense of engaging in more searching inquiry about
the real policies and effects of legislative enactments. The garbage cases provide
examples of litigants fighting tooth and nail over what test will be applied. This is
so because both sides, as well as the judge, assume that if per se is applied, the
state will lose, whereas if Pike is applied, the state will win.
Something important is lost when all dormant Commerce Clause cases must be
made to fit such Procrustean beds. Rather than engage in either-or deterministic
labeling of facts which arguably could be characterized more neutrally, it might be
well for courts to ask whether current tests serve as accurate shortcuts for imputing
either protectionist or nonprotectionist effect to legislative enactments. If protectionism can be detected or evaluated more directly without the tests, or by making
the tests truly rebuttable presumptions rather than deterministic categorizations, then
this should be done, so long as it would not mire the judiciary in excessive sifting
of facts. If the either-or tests are necessary to speed the judicial process, despite
their occasional mischaracterizations about what is truly going on, then this should
be more explicitly acknowledged.
Finally, if it is too much to hope that the Court in future dormant Commerce
Clause decisions will realign its recent dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
toward detecting actual policy effects rather than focusing so much on affixing the
right label, it should not be too much to expect the Court to reaffirm in future cases
that industry does not have a vested right to an unregulated market. The tendency
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of some lower courts to promote economic vestedness or economic due process

doctrines under cover of the dormant Commerce Clause should be rejected.
Political pressures and externalities associated with waste mean that state and
local governments will inevitably try to regulate so that they are not overburdened
with other states' exported problems." The waste cases will likely continue to be
debating pits where seriously divergent views about the reasons for and
methodology of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny will be offered up to appellate
tribunals. As in the recent past, future appellate waste decisions are likely to have
a significant effect on larger dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Two Commerce
Clause truths, currently under serious attack, should be reaffirmed in these future
waste battles. First, reasonably evenhanded methods of dealing with serious
problems should ba allowed to have a fighting chance at surviving dormant
Commerce Clause attack, despite incidental detrimental effect on outsiders. Second,
states should be free of further dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny when they use
their own funds thrcugh market participation to address problems. It is to be hoped
that the Court in future cases will reaffirm these principles, and thereby keep
dormant Commerce Clause analysis from becoming a recycling of substantive
economic due process values.

251. For additional elaboration of this point, see, e.g., Cox, What May States Do?, supra note 21,
at 556-64; cf. Richard L Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2341 (1996) (arguing for changes in existing standards to deal with the reality of externalities
imposed on states again3t their will).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/7

